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ABSTRACT
1983: The Most Dangerous Year
by
Andrew Russell Garland
Dr. Joseph A. Fry, Examination Committee Chair
Distinguished Professor of History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
A series of otherwise unrelated events culminated to make 1983 the most
dangerous year the world has ever known, with the United States and the Soviet Union
even closer to war than during the much more well-known events of the 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis. The crisis of 1983 arose from a sequence of accidents, misunderstandings,
and mistakes. From highly publicized events such as President Ronald Reagan‘s
application of morality to foreign policy to the Soviet Union‘s attempt to discover
NATO‘s secret attack plans, an extraordinary confluence of events brought the two
superpowers closer to nuclear exchange than is commonly believed. More than ten
separate events drove the United States and Soviet Union on a collision course in a battle
of wills, the outcome of which provided a de facto end of the Cold War nearly a decade
before it was considered officially over. Due to the lack of open communication between
the two superpowers, the world was largely unaware of the significance of these events as
they unfolded.
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PROLOGUE
During World War II, the Soviet Union and the United States were cautious allies,
bound together by the old adage, ―the enemy of my enemy is my friend.‖ Even before
the euphoria of victory had faded, however, the world realized it had been polarized by
the emerging superpowers. In the ensuing years, the United States and the Soviet Union
fought with words, with boycotts, with proxy combatants in such places as Vietnam and
Afghanistan, and on several occasions nearly with nuclear weapons. While many people
consider the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 to have been the closest the world came to
nuclear war, the situation was much more precarious two decades later, when a series of
otherwise unrelated events culminated to make 1983 the most dangerous year the world
has ever known.
Unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis, the war of 1983 would not have arisen from two
opponents who were unable to resolve a single issue, but instead would have been caused
by a sequence of accidents, misunderstandings, and mistakes. From President Ronald
Reagan‘s high-profile application of morality to foreign policy to the covert Soviet
attempt to discover NATO‘s attack plans, an extraordinary confluence of events brought
the two superpowers closer to a nuclear exchange than is commonly believed. An
escalating spiral of separate occurrences drove the United States and Soviet Union on a
collision course in a battle of wills, the outcome of which provided a de facto end of the
Cold War nearly a decade before it was considered officially over.
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CHAPTER 1
NEW TECHNOLOGIES OF WAR
The era of détente that spanned most of the 1970s was marked by numerous
successful negotiations and agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union.
In addition to the well-known Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement I, the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty, the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement, and the Threshold
Test Ban Treaty were all negotiated in this era and represented the first protocols that
sought to actually regulate the existing nuclear weapons of the two superpowers.
The complexities of these negotiations were staggering, with enormous variations
of perspective. The most notable began immediately, with the first word of the title of
one of the agreements: ―strategic.‖ What exactly defined a strategic weapon, as opposed
to a tactical or theater one? The Soviets argued that any weapons capable of targeting the
territory of the other side were strategic. By this rubric, U.S. intermediate-range missiles
in Europe were strategic but Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe were not. The
Soviet Union‘s chief allies were adjacent to its territory, allowing Moscow to position its
weapons so that its nuclear ―umbrella‖ covered its allies from sites within the USSR; thus
the Soviets had no forward-deployed nuclear arms in the 1970s. The United States, on
the other hand, was bound to extend its defense across two oceans to include Japan,
South Korea, and Western Europe and had relied upon its forward-deployed nuclear
weapons systems for decades. Additionally, from the perspective of the European
nations whose fates were in the hands of the superpowers, virtually all the weapons under
discussion could reach their territory and thus could be considered strategic.1 Finally, the
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terms of the SALT I treaty defined the term ―strategic‖ to apply to any ―ballistic missiles
capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the
continental United States and the northwestern border of the continental USSR.‖2 This
restriction on the scope of the SALT treaties left Europe open for the development and
deployment of short-range and intermediate-range missiles. The Soviet Union moved
first, with ―unrestrained deployment in European Russia in 1977 of the new SS-20
medium-range nuclear missile, targeted on Western Europe,‖ but the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) soon moved to match this capability.3
The Soviet mobile intermediate-range missile was identified by the Warsaw Pact
as the RSD-10 Pioneer and known to NATO personnel as the SS-20 Saber. The first SS20 systems were fielded on March 11, 1976; it took approximately five months for the
first units to become fully operational. The SS-20 replaced and augmented the SS-4 and
SS-5 missiles of the early 1960s, which had been matched against U.S. Pershing I
missiles of the same era. Thus, immune from the SALT treaties, the SS-20 provided the
Soviet Union with a marked advantage in mobile intermediate-range nuclear missile
abilities.
In February 1978, NATO analysts determined that their European nuclear arsenal
had become deficient and began evaluating options for advancement. After a brief
review of weapons in development provided by the Pentagon, the decision was made to
take a dramatic leap forward.4 On December 12, 1979, NATO‘s Secretary General,
Joseph Luns, announced that the Soviets‘ monopoly on intermediate-range ballistic
2
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missiles would be ended. 5 Two sophisticated systems would be utilized in concert:
Pershing II mobile intermediate-range missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles launched
from permanent installations. Pershing IIs were significantly smaller than their Soviet
counterparts, making them easier to transport and conceal. The Pershing II was also
more accurate than any comparable missile. In the arithmetic of nuclear warfare,
increased accuracy equates to the need for fewer missiles to ensure the target is hit.
Technologically, the Pershing II far outclassed the SS-20, and ostensibly provided NATO
with increased capability.
NATO‘s nuclear strategy was described as ―flexible response.‖ For nuclear
deterrence to be successful, it had to be credible. One way to increase credibility was to
provide multiple echelons of response, varying from short-range, small-yield tactical
battlefield systems to long-range strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic
missiles.6 With this range of options, NATO forces could conceivably match any
Warsaw Pact action without committing to full-scale annihilation warfare. The fear at
NATO headquarters was that Soviet forces could employ weapons up to intermediaterange level while issuing diplomatic assurances that the war would not be further
escalated. This, in turn, could have resulted in NATO‘s reluctance to employ strategic
weapons and a Warsaw Pact victory in a limited nuclear engagement in Europe.
Ironically, these fears virtually mirrored those felt in the Kremlin.
The Soviets received notice in late 1979 of a weapon that was not scheduled to be
fielded for four more years. Furthermore, the missiles in question were comparable to
weapons already employed by the Soviets. Despite all this, the Soviet Union reacted to

5
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the announcement as if it were the Cuban Missile Crisis turned back on them. On June
22, 1981, Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov publicly condemned the Pershing IIs, saying
the missiles were an attempt by the United States to safeguard North America by shifting
the focus of World War III to Europe. ―Everyone knows,‖ Ustinov asserted, ―that the
chief purpose of the scheme to deploy the new U.S. missiles in Western Europe is, by
unleashing a new world war about whose preparation the Pentagon strategists are talking
so cynically, to subject the Federal Republic of Germany and other allies to a destructive
retaliation strike and try to sit it out.‖7 A less rational but equally likely reason for the
Soviet‘s disquiet could have been the presence of nuclear weapons on German soil, given
Germany‘s betrayal of the Soviet Union in 1941 and Russians‘ long memories of such
transgressions.8
The Soviet Union had first deployed missiles of this category to Eastern Europe in
1977, and already had in place far more missiles than were necessary to repel any
invasion by ground forces. Publicly, the Soviet Union denied the feasibility of limited
nuclear warfare. In the official Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda in 1981,
Defense Minister Ustinov wrote, ―Could anyone in his right mind speak seriously of any
limited nuclear war? It should be quite clear that the aggressor‘s actions will instantly
and inevitably trigger a devastating counterstrike by the other side. None but completely
irresponsible people could maintain that a nuclear war may be made to follow rules
adopted beforehand with nuclear missiles exploding in ‗gentlemanly manner‘ over
strictly designated targets and sparing the population.‖9
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Regardless of their public position, Soviet military leadership would have been
remiss to rely on the ―right mind‖ of their wartime opponents. Weapons do not exist
without the plans to use them. Warsaw Pact war plans released by the government of
Poland in 2005 provide significant insight into the intended use of intermediate-range
nuclear forces (INF). According to one plan, referred to as ―Seven Days to the River
Rhine,‖ the Warsaw Pact would have responded to a European invasion by NATO
conventional forces with nuclear strikes on major Western European cities.10 Details of
this plan revealed that France and the United Kingdom would not have been targeted by
nuclear weapons, implying that Warsaw Pact planners considered the use of INF in terms
of a limited, winnable nuclear exchange.
Soviet leadership also considered the use of INF by NATO forces. Yuri
Andropov, both as director of the KGB and General Secretary of the Communist Party,
was told by his analysts that the Pershing II would be able to annihilate Moscow in six
minutes, with only minimal warning. The satellites designed to detect missile launches
were all directed toward the United States, and would have to be repositioned or
supplemented in order to observe Pershing II launch sites in West Germany and
Tomahawk cruise missile sites spread across Western Europe from Italy to England. It
would take up to two minutes for ground-based radar systems to detect the incoming
missiles, and another minute for the warning to be issued. Communist Party leaders
could only conclude that, with the Soviet military effectively decapitated and/or key
strategic sites destroyed, the United States would have won a nuclear war.11
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Soviet leaders organized a flurry of diplomatic and propaganda activity intended
to prevent or delay a nuclear war in the early 1980s. The Soviets supported United
Nations Resolution 36/100, titled ―Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear
Catastrophe,‖ that declared first use of nuclear weapons to be a crime against humanity.12
In March 1982, they proposed that both the United States and Soviet Union pull their
nuclear missile submarines back from their forward patrol areas to reduce the threat of
short-notice missile attacks.13 General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev publicly pledged not
to use nuclear arms first, declaring ―the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics assumes an
obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.‖ Boldly moving without guarantee
that the United States would do the same, Brezhnev pronounced this position
immediately in force: ―This obligation shall become effective immediately, on the
moment it is made public from the rostrum of the General Assembly.‖14 The implied
challenge to the United States to reciprocate was clear. On May 27, 1983, less than six
months before the scheduled arrival of Pershing II missiles in West Germany, Pravda
published a warning that ―deployment of these missiles would… sharply aggravate
nuclear confrontation, and would increase the risk of the outbreak of war.‖15 The White
House read these measures as if they were propaganda posturing intended to undermine
the deployment of the Pershing II missiles. In this, they were correct, except for
underestimating the real fear in the Kremlin. The day after the first Pershing II missiles
arrived, Andropov announced that their new SS-21 Scarab mobile missile systems would
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be forward-deployed to Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic.16 This
move exemplified the arms-race mentality of the era. In simplistic terms, the SS-20
provoked the Pershing II, which in turn provoked the SS-21 in a continuing cycle of
escalation.
In early 1981, an American technological advance caused the western world to
marvel while the Soviets recognized a terrifying new threat: the United States had
launched the space shuttle Columbia. Launched on April 12, 1981, Columbia completed
thirty-six orbits in a little over fifty-four hours before landing safely.17 Surely, the
Soviets reasoned, this could only be a template for a space bomber. The idea had been
around for decades; plans for a rocket-powered Amerikä Bomber had been presented to
Hitler‘s Luftwaffe in the early 1940s. The vehicle would have been able to launch from
Germany and utilize a technique called ―dynamic soaring‖ or ―skip-gliding‖ to bounce
along the upper atmosphere and deliver its payload on New York City. The plane would
glide to a rest approximately 12,000 miles from its point of origin.18
NASA‘s space shuttle program was not seen as capable of generating a profit, and
the Soviets expected that the only thing in which capitalists would invest without
expected return was military equipment. Efraim Akin, a scientist with the Soviet
Academy of Sciences‘ Institute of Applied Mathematics, outlined how quickly the Soviet
thought process turned to military views. ―Very early our calculations showed that the
cost figures being used by NASA were unrealistic. It would be better to use a series of
expendable launch vehicles. Then, when we learned of the decision to build a Shuttle

16
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launch facility at Vandenberg for military purposes, we noted that the trajectories from
Vandenberg allowed an overflight of the main centers of the USSR on the first orbit.‖
According to the calculations of the Institute of Applied Mathematics, the Shuttle would
be able to enter Soviet airspace from orbit approximately three and a half minutes after
launch from the Vandenberg Launch Site. This timeline would be shorter than
submarine-launched ballistic missiles off the coast (approximately ten minutes) or
intermediate-range ballistic missiles from West Germany (approximately six and a half
minutes). As a result, the Soviet military reacted as if the Shuttle was intended to be a
first-strike weapon. ―Because of our suspicion and distrust we decided to replicate the
Shuttle without a full understanding of its mission,‖ said Akin. 19
One of the announced physical capabilities of the Shuttle particularly troubled the
Soviets: the Shuttle could launch with 30 tons of cargo, and return with 15 tons. Yuriy
Mozzhorin, the director of the Soviet Union‘s Central Scientific Research Institute for
Machine Building (TsNIIMash), remarked, ―All this was very unusual: the mass they had
been putting into orbit with their expendable rockets hadn‘t even reached 150 tons per
year, and now they were planning to launch 1,770 tons per year. Nothing was being
returned from space and now they were planning to bring down 820 tons per year.‖20 To
the Soviets, this suggested that the space shuttle program would be used to place
experimental laser weapons into orbit. The effects of orbit could not be adequately
simulated on Earth, so it would be necessary to test them in space and be able to retrieve
them to make adjustments and modifications.

19
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Another peculiarity of the Shuttle design required by the U.S. Air Force was its
ability to travel 1,200 miles under its own power, enabling it to return to Vandenberg
after one trip around the Earth. This feature was designed to quickly service polarorbiting intelligence satellites or even capture enemy satellites without providing enough
notice for the Soviets to react. Additionally, this capability was required as a safety
measure to allow the Shuttle to complete the ―Abort Once Around‖ maneuver in the
event that a main engine failure resulted in an incorrect and unrecoverable orbit.21
The Soviet Union‘s top scientist, President of the Academy of Sciences and
member of the Central Committee, Mstislav Keldysh, urged that the Soviet Union pursue
its own reusable space vehicle. Many in the Central Committee, including General
Secretary Brezhnev and Defense Minister Ustinov, felt that the USSR must match any
threats posed by the U.S. Shuttle. These perspectives may have been manipulated by
Keldysh, who was eager to advance Soviet practical sciences. When the Institute of
Space Sciences was unable to justify the pursuit of a Soviet shuttle, Keldysh tweaked the
wording, saying ―We do not see any sensible scenario that would support the Shuttle for
scientific uses,‖ reinforcing the option of military uses.22
Two years and four launches after the initial demonstration flight of the
Columbia, what had been a horrifying Soviet suspicion became even more dreadful when
the United States launched its second Space Shuttle, the Challenger, on April 4, 1983.
The Challenger flew three missions during 1983, and Columbia flew one.23 There had
been no overt signs that the system was intended to be a weapon, but even so the success
of the orbiters represented a significant technological gap for the entire world to see. The
21
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overall situation was a quite similar to events that occurred more than twenty-five years
earlier when the Soviet Union demonstrated its long-range missile capability with the
launch of the first man-made satellite, Sputnik. John Gaddis compared the shocking
effect of the Sputnik launch to that of Pearl Harbor and the North Korean invasion of
South Korea. The United States was within range of Soviet missiles, which could be
armed with nuclear warheads. The warning time of an impending attack had been several
hours when only bomber aircraft were available; missiles reduced that time to less than
half an hour.24 The Sputnik launch of 1957 resulted in the perception of a ―missile gap‖
that invoked serious fear in the population of the United States, just before the discovery
of Soviet missiles in Cuba and the crisis that took the world to the brink of nuclear war.
The U.S. Space Shuttle flights contributed to a similar atmosphere of anxiety and fear in
the Soviet Union, and foreshadowed the war scare that developed throughout 1983.
While the 1970s produced the first real regulations on existing nuclear weapons,
the early 1980s proved that the era of hopeful negotiations was over. New and
potentially frightening technological developments perpetuated the arms race and
harkened back to the Cuban Missile Crisis, previously the most dangerous era of U.S.Soviet relations. Along with the escalation in arms technology, the Soviet Union and the
United States each selected new leaders who were predisposed to distrust each other.

24
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CHAPTER 2
NEW MEN IN POWER
While several of the events of 1983 had their roots in prior years, the crisis began
to build momentum on November 12, 1982. On this day, two days after the death of
Leonid Brezhnev, former KGB chairman Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov ascended to the
pinnacle of Soviet power as General Secretary of the Communist Party.25 Andropov‘s
resumé included three years as ambassador to Hungary, during which he participated in
the brutal suppression of the Hungarian Uprising of 1956. This event had a significant
impact on Andropov, resulting in a predilection for military intervention that his
associates termed a ―Hungarian complex.‖26 Andropov returned to Moscow in 1957 to
head the Foreign Affairs department of the Central Committee that dealt with other
fraternal socialist countries.27 For ten years, Andropov worked the intrigues of Soviet
politics to ingratiate himself with those in power, resulting in his surprise appointment as
Chairman of the Committee for State Security, better known as the KGB.28
As Chairman of the KGB, Andropov immediately displayed an aversion to
intelligence information that did not conform to his preconceived notions. Andropov was
deeply concerned with the ―Prague Spring‖ reform movement that began on January 5,
1968, and focused his agency‘s efforts on undermining the dissidents. Oleg Kalugin, a
senior KGB official posted in Washington, D.C., reported ―absolutely reliable
documents‖ that proved no western agency was manipulating the Czechoslovakian
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reforms. Andropov ordered these reports kept from the Politburo, and when Kalugin
returned to Moscow he discovered the directive that ―my messages should not be shown
to anyone, and destroyed.‖ Instead, Andropov directed the KGB to foment ―the fear that
Czechoslovakia could fall victim to NATO aggression or to a coup.‖ On August 18,
1968, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland agreed on military
intervention in Czechoslovakia—the largest military action in Europe since World War
II—based on spurious information provided by Andropov‘s KGB.29
Andropov continued his war against dissidents, especially within the Soviet
Union and wherever its defectors could be located. The KGB targeted Rudolf Nureyev
and Natalia Makarova, dancers who defected from the Kirov Ballet in 1961 and 1970,
respectively, without significant success. Such intents, dubbed ―special actions,‖
represented the dedication of ―enormous amounts of time and resources…to tracking
down defectors and preparing to kill and maim them.‖30
Eleven years after the suppression of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia,
Andropov again used his position to influence Soviet military intervention abroad. In the
aftermath of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Soviet General Staff feared the United
States would relocate its assets from Iran to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Andropov
capitalized on this possibility to press Brezhnev for intervention. The threat of U.S.
missiles in Afghanistan that could range into Kazakhstan and Siberia was too much to
bear. The announcement of the planned development and deployment of intermediaterange Pershing II missiles by NATO forces was twisted to validate this fear. Andropov
also demonstrated his hawkish nature through his vehement response to opposition.
29
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Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, chief of the Soviet General Staff, foresaw the political
repercussions, arguing: ―We would align the entire Islamist East against us and suffer
political damage around the world.‖ Andropov shouted him down harshly, ―Focus on
military affairs! Leave policy-making to us, the party, and Leonid Ilyich [Brezhnev]!‖31
Rather than face the potential of nuclear missiles stationed along the southern border of
the Soviet Union, Brezhnev approved the movement of the Red Army into Afghanistan.
Andropov‘s militant opposition to liberalization and dissent had grown to epic
proportions, though his true sentiments were largely unknown in the West. When
Andropov replaced Leonid Brezhnev as General Secretary, biographical information on
him was most notable for its obvious inconsistencies. Details as mundane as Andropov‘s
build and appearance were unverified, but were published with colorful commentary to
obscure the lack of actual facts. In an article for The New Republic, Edward Jay Epstein
compared the various depictions of Andropov in the media. A concise example of the
disparity of reporting focused on Andropov‘s birthplace. Epstein wrote, ―The
Washington Post initially reported that he was ‗a native of Karelia,‘ a Soviet province on
the Finnish border. The New York Times gave his birthplace as the ‗southern Ukraine,‘
which is hundreds of miles to the south. And Time said he had been born in ‗the village
of Nagutskoye in the northern Caucasus.‘ His birthplace was thus narrowed down to an
area stretching from Finland to Iran.‖32 The reasons for this uncertainty included the
KGB‘s disinformation apparatus and the necessity of western media to rely on anecdotes
from Russian emigrants without the ability to substantiate them.

31
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Soviet leadership had, for decades, acted on a mentality of skepticism and
suspicion that cast a pall over Soviet relations with virtually every other country. The era
of leaders who lived through World War II regarded the Nazis‘ surprise attack on June
22, 1941, as the greatest trauma of their lives. They would not allow themselves to
misread an enemy‘s intentions so severely again.33 To their considerable sorrow, Soviet
General Secretary Joseph Stalin and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had trusted
that their Nazi Counterparts, Adolf Hitler and Joachim von Ribbentrop, would honor their
commitment to the Nonaggression Pact of 1939. Two decades later, Stalin‘s successor
Nikita Khrushchev was shocked by President Kennedy‘s reaction to the medium-range
ballistic missiles deployed to Cuba, resulting in his public humiliation and ouster as
General Secretary after backing down to U.S. pressure. Successive Soviet leaders were
determined not to repeat these mistakes. Unwilling to allow an appearance of
vulnerability as détente soured in the late 1970s, the Soviet General Staff elevated its
intelligence apparatus to a wartime footing. By the end of Leonid Brezhnev‘s term as
General Secretary, the Kremlin walls were firmly buttressed by distrust and resentment.
Most Soviet leaders expected that any future nuclear war would not begin as an
unprecedented, Pearl Harbor-style attack, but rather as a tense political situation that
escalated out of control, similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis.34 The breakdown of détente
included several such situations, one of which was the movement of Soviet troops into
Afghanistan in December 1979. The Soviets considered this a minor stabilization action
similar to the suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the 1968 ―Prague

33
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Spring.‖35 The Politburo deemed the intervention in Afghanistan so insignificant that no
one was consulted on the potential U.S. response. Even though Anatoly Dobrynin, the
Soviet ambassador to the United States, was in Moscow at the time, he was not informed
of the invasion until he heard about it on a radio news broadcast.36 Foreign Minister
Gromyko believed that ―the American reaction, whatever it might be, was not a major
factor to be taken into consideration.‖37 Secretary General Brezhnev, for his part, assured
Dobrynin that ―it‘ll be over in three to four weeks.‖38 Unlike those previous
interventions, the Afghanistan crisis escalated unexpectedly in various directions.
President Jimmy Carter‘s responded by withdrawing the SALT II treaty from
consideration by the Senate, cancelling a grain trade agreement that would have benefited
both countries, and boycotting the 1980 Summer Olympics hosted by Moscow.
President Carter went so far as to describe Soviet troops in Afghanistan as ―the most
serious threat to the peace since the Second World War.‖39 To the Soviets, the fact that a
military intervention in an adjacent country could have such far-reaching consequences
was an indicator that tensions could flare at any time and that they must take steps to be
prepared.
In May 1981, Soviet Premier Brezhnev addressed an audience of combined KGB
agents and officers of the GRU, the Red Army‘s military intelligence branch. Brezhnev
warned the assembly that the Soviet Union and the United States were on the nuclear
brink. Following Brezhnev at the podium was KGB chairman Andropov, who made a
groundbreaking announcement. Some of his remarks were reported by Oleg Gordievsky,
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a KGB colonel who had been working for British intelligence since 1974: ―The new
American administration, he [Andropov] declared, was actively preparing for nuclear
war.‖40 For the first time in history, the two primary intelligence organizations, the KGB
and GRU, were to cooperate in an extensive new mission. The name of the operation
was enough to command the full attention of the audience: ―Nuclear Missile Attack,‖
abbreviated RYAN from its Russian name, ―raketno-yadernoye napadenie.‖ In some
sources, the word ―surprise (vnezapnoye),‖ is added to the title, resulting in the less
English-friendly appellation ―Operation VRYAN.‖41 To add emphasis to his message
when it was distributed by telegram to KGB residences worldwide, Andropov declared,
―not since the end of the Second World War has the international situation been as
explosive as it is now.‖42
Operation RYAN, the ―Assignment to Discover NATO Preparations for a Nuclear
Attack,‖ was the largest Soviet intelligence effort since World War II, and took priority
over any other KGB and GRU activities. The creators of RYAN had assembled a list of
events that were deemed indicators of an impending nuclear attack, and subdivided that
list into ―Immediate tasks of Residencies for Collecting Information and Organizing their
Work‖ and ―Principle Prospective Directions for the Residency to Pursue its Work of
Collecting the Information Needed to Discover the Adversary‘s Preparations for RYAN.‖
Among the tasks designated as immediate were identifying locations, routes, and
methods for the evacuation of government officials; determining levels of preparedness
of Civil Defense shelters; measuring an increase in the blood supply maintained by
40
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hospitals expecting mass casualties; monitoring traffic at locations frequented by
employees of key government installations during their off-duty hours; and observing
routine traffic patterns around key government installations.43 In their details of these
tasks, KGB leaders in Moscow Centre demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of
western medical procedures when they instructed their agents to report any significant
increase in the price paid to blood donors.44 It was not customary in either the United
States or the United Kingdom for blood donors to receive monetary compensation.
The second list, ―Principal Prospective Directions,‖ included suggested
instructions on how to carry out the tasks on the first list. Some of these suggestions
were based on the fundamental differences between western capitalist and eastern
Communist societies, lending credence to the maxim, ―we fear that which we do not
understand.‖ The conspiratorial views of Moscow Centre under Chairman Andropov
were disseminated throughout the Soviet intelligence apparatus as part of Operation
RYAN. KGB agents were instructed to monitor financial institutions, under the
impression that they might be in the confidence of the U.S. government: ―Bearing in
mind the very considerable knowledge possessed by the heads of international and the
larger national banks, examine the possibility of obtaining information about RYAN from
such circles.‖ Similarly, the KGB suspected that the U.S. government might have been in
collusion with the church, and agents were charged with ―assessing the degree of
likelihood that the heads of national churches and international church organizations, and
the leadership and institutions of the Vatican abroad would be aware of preparation for a
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nuclear attack and clarifying possibilities of obtaining information about RYAN from
these circles.‖45
KGB headquarters sent a supplemental message to its residencies on August 12,
1983, identifying several activities as potential indications of impending nuclear war.
Titled Permanent Operational Assignment to Detect Signs of NATO Preparations for a
Nuclear Attack on the U.S.S.R. as Reflected in the Activity of Special Services of the
NATO Bloc, the document augmented the indicators suggested by the original Operation
RYAN brief and identified such events as an increase in covert insertions of agents into
the Soviet Union, an increase in contacts between NATO intelligence agencies, increased
disinformation operations directed against the Soviet Union, or upgrading the security
elements at government installations. Most interesting among the potential indicators of
impending nuclear attack were two items indicative of the Soviet Union‘s tendency to
ascribe its own values to its opponent. The KGB‘s worldwide network was directed to
watch for ―reinforcement of repressive measures by the punitive authorities against
progressive organizations and individuals‖ and ―restrictions on the use of telephone and
telegraph network.‖46
The KGB‘s field agents stationed abroad did not always agree with the suspicions
behind Operation RYAN. Although not inclined to support the premise that the United
States was planning a surprise nuclear war, KGB agents were even less inclined to risk
their careers by debating their instructions. In some cases, RYAN assignments were
relegated to junior officers and not fully supported. The KGB‘s Chief-of-Station in
London, Arkadi Guk, assigned the colossal task of monitoring the movement of official
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cars and lighted windows at government and military facilities and investigating the
evacuation routes of important personnel and their families to one junior officer who did
not have access to personal transportation or permission to travel outside London.47
While it is unknown whether or not other KGB stations put forth more effort than
London, none were willing to sacrifice their careers by contradicting Moscow Centre‘s
assessment. Another common flaw was that potentially negligible or spurious
information was reported to higher headquarters, which in turn became even more
alarmed and sought more information.48 The tendency to provide whatever was
requested, whether or not it was valid, was recognized within the Soviet intelligence
community. During the tumultuous time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, one
political intelligence officer was quoted in the September 24, 1991, issue of Izvestia as
saying, ―In order to please our superiors, we sent in falsified and biased information,
acting on the principle ‗Blame everything on the Americans and everything will be OK.‘
That‘s not intelligence, it‘s self-deception!‖49
Thus, the Kremlin was prepared for a 1983 in which the United States was the
definitive enemy. Andropov and his government were predisposed to view any and all
American actions with suspicion and distrust. They based their policies on the
assumption that the United States was actively plotting their doom, which gave the Soviet
Union the feeling that they were involved in a fight for survival.
Just as there was a new man with a new perspective in the Kremlin, there was a
departure from previous attitudes in the White House. President Harry Truman had
established the first overall U.S. policy toward communist states when he approved NSC47
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68 in 1950. Inspired heavily by the writings of George Kennan, NSC-68 outlined the
concept of ―containment.‖ Essentially, the policy at this time assumed an aggressive
expansionist Soviet mentality bent on world domination that had to be resisted with
military action to maintain the status quo, as demonstrated in Korea and Vietnam.50 By
the early 1970s, containment was replaced by ―détente,‖ roughly translated into
―relaxation‖ or ―easing of tensions.‖ A new era of diplomacy began, with the successful
negotiation of the SALT I treaty, Biological Weapons Convention, Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, the Helsinki Accords, and the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.51 This era of good
feelings waned under the presidency of Jimmy Carter, who was sincerely concerned with
human rights in the Soviet Union and the Red Army‘s activities in Afghanistan. Soviet
leaders expected to be able to deal with Reagan as they had with Nixon, not knowing that
Reagan would take Carter‘s concerns even further.52
Ronald Reagan disagreed fundamentally with the philosophy of both the
―containment‖ and ―détente‖ approaches to relations with the Soviet Union. In 1976,
Reagan characterized détente as ―a one-way street that simply gives the Soviets what they
want with nothing in return.‖53 From his perspective, containment and détente shared a
fundamental flaw: both assumed the Soviet Union was an unavoidable presence in the
world. Rather than finding ways to coexist with the Soviet Union, Reagan argued that
the United States should be trying to change the Soviet system. Reagan believed that
communism was doomed to fail, and described it in 1975 as ―a temporary aberration
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which will one day disappear from the earth because it is contrary to human nature.‖54
Reagan sought to overturn previous notions of U.S.-Soviet relations by changing the
language, ideas, and thought processes used to discuss the Soviet Union.55
President Reagan wanted to engage with Soviet leadership, but felt that if he
extended the olive branch with the world as it was it might be interpreted by the Soviet
Union as a reward for bad behavior. Reagan addressed the tough stance his
administration initially took in his autobiography, ―there was a new management in the
White House along with a new realism regarding the Russians, and until they behaved
themselves, they could expect more of the same.‖ Reagan recognized that this was an
unhelpful attitude, and tried to change. He wrote, ―It was dangerous to continue the EastWest nuclear standoff forever, and I decided that if the Russians wouldn‘t take the first
step, I should.‖56 Reagan initiated correspondence with Leonid Brezhnev on April 24,
1981, with little success. Brezhnev‘s response, as recorded by Reagan, was unfriendly,
―He said he, too, was against making immediate plans for a summit, repudiated
everything I‘d said about the Soviet Union, blamed the United States for starting and
perpetuating the Cold War, and then said we had no business telling the Soviets what
they could or could not do anywhere in the world.‖57 Reagan continued to believe that
the United States and Soviet Union should have a dialogue, but would not attempt to
open channels until he thought the conditions were right. Reagan wrote, ―we had to send
as powerful a message as we could to the Russians that we weren‘t going to stand by
anymore while they armed and financed terrorists and subverted democratic
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governments. Our policy was to be one based on strength and realism. I wanted peace
through strength, not peace through a piece of paper.‖58 Reagan sought to engage the
Soviets, but not until the United States could set the terms. He wanted to be proud of
America‘s foreign policy, and it was important to him to be doing what he thought was
―right.‖ This concept of viewing foreign policy through the lens of morality
characterized the third and final chapter of U.S.-Soviet relations, frequently dubbed
―rollback.‖
On January 17, 1983, President Reagan defined his approach when he approved
NSDD-75. The Reagan Administration used National Security Decision Directives
(NSDD) to establish official internal policy on matters of defense, intelligence, and
foreign policy. NSDD-75, titled ―U.S. Relations with the USSR,‖ detailed a threepronged strategy that focused American policy on actively seeking change within the
government of the Soviet Union. Reagan‘s administration intended to contain and
reverse Soviet expansionism; nudge the Soviet political system ―toward a more pluralistic
political and economic system in which the power of the privileged elite is gradually
reduced‖; and engage in negotiations with the Soviet Union to protect U.S. interests,
especially in times of Soviet political succession.59
NSDD-75 also included an emphasis on morality and values. ―U.S. policy must
have an ideological thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western
values of individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free trade unions, free enterprise,
and political democracy over the repressive features of Soviet Communism.‖60 The
Reagan Administration recognized that such a dramatic departure from previous policy
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would require long-term commitment and likely be met with domestic resistance. ―In the
absence of dramatic near-term victories in the U.S. effort to moderate Soviet behavior,
pressure is likely to mount for change in U.S. policy. There will be appeals from
important segments of domestic opinion for a more ‗normal‘ U.S.-Soviet relationship,
particularly in a period of political transition in Moscow.‖61 NSDD-75 codified a new
perspective on relations with the Soviet Union, but its contents remained largely
unknown until it was declassified in 1994. It was nearly two months before the new tone
got its first public exposure.
On March 8, President Reagan gave an address to the Annual Convention of the
National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida. This speech was primarily
concerned with his own personal religious beliefs, but as with most presidential missives,
the Soviet Union and communism were prominent. An ongoing issue was the debate
over the proposed nuclear arms freeze suggested by the Soviets. Many religious groups
supported the freeze, arguing that it could be the first step in reducing or eliminating
these weapons. The National Association of Evangelicals had not yet publicly
announced its position. Given the venue, the President felt that it would be appropriate
for him to convey his moral opinion of communism: ―Yes, let us pray for the salvation of
all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness – pray they will discover the joy of
knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of
the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual
domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.‖
Later, President Reagan expounded on the specific issue of the nuclear freeze: ―So, in
your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of
61
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pride -- the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides
equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil
empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove
yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.‖62
This speech was by far President Reagan‘s most overt use of morality in foreign
policy decisions. By characterizing the Soviet Union as an ―evil empire,‖ Reagan made a
calculated gesture to send two messages at once. Over the objections of his long-time
political advisor, Stuart Spencer, and even his wife Nancy, Reagan said those words
―with malice aforethought… I wanted to let [Soviet leader Yuri] Andropov know we
recognized the Soviets for what they were.‖63 Not only did Reagan serve notice to the
Soviet Union, he indicated that compromise with the Soviets (specifically the nuclear
freeze) was tantamount to a deal with the devil.
Ironically, at the time of President Reagan‘s condemnation of the Soviet Union as
―the focus of evil in the modern world,‖ he had only met with two Soviet leaders, on two
occasions, nearly a decade apart. The first meeting occurred on June 23, 1973, when
President Richard Nixon hosted Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev in his home in San
Clemente, California, during Ronald Reagan‘s term as governor, and the men met briefly
at a reception.64 Despite this extremely limited interaction, Reagan‘s anti-Soviet stance
was firm during the first days of his administration. Within days of his inauguration,
Reagan casually remarked to reporters after a news conference that détente was
nonproductive for the United States, and that Soviets ―reserve unto themselves the right
62
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to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat‖ in order to attain their self-declared goal of world
domination. On the way back to the Oval Office, Reagan turned to his national security
advisor, Richard Allen, and asked, ―Say, Dick, they do lie and cheat, don‘t they?‖65
Reagan‘s personal experience with Soviets was so limited that it caught the
attention of the recently-appointed Secretary of State George Shultz: ―It finally dawned
on me that President Reagan had never had a real conversation with a top Communist
leader, and that he wanted to have one.‖66 Shultz brought up the topic in private
conversation with Reagan, offering to arrange a meeting with Anatoly Dobrynin, the
Soviet Ambassador to the United States since 1962. On February 15, 1981, less than a
month after the aforementioned news conference, Ambassador Dobrynin arrived at the
State Department for a routine meeting. He was surprised and delighted to be invited
instead to meet the President. Dobrynin was smuggled into the living quarters of the
White House, where he, Reagan, and Shultz talked for two hours.67 This was Reagan‘s
second meeting with a Soviet government official, and the first with significant
interaction.
Just a few weeks after the ―Evil Empire‖ speech, on March 23, what could have
been an innocuous argument for support of his budget proposal became groundbreaking
when President Reagan revealed his intention to surpass the protection afforded by
Mutual Assured Destruction and pursue a missile defense program. The only recognized
defense against nuclear missile attack was the knowledge that any such attack would be
met with such devastating retaliation that it would be impractical to use such weapons.
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The variety of nuclear arms, including ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles,
intermediate-range nuclear missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and aircraftdelivered nuclear bombs and cruise missiles, made it virtually impossible for any armed
force to believe itself capable of successfully preempting its adversary‘s retaliatory strike.
Thus, the safety of the world, according to his conceptual approach, depended on all
parties with access to nuclear weapons being sufficiently rational to understand the
unacceptable consequences of their actions. In what came to be known as the ―Grand
Vision‖ speech, President Reagan advocated an active defense when he asked, ―What if
free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the
threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and
destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our
allies?‖68
Reagan knew that this would be an expensive, expansive undertaking. He made
no claims of an estimated time of delivery, or even any assurances that the goal was
attainable. With an eye fixed on the distant future, Reagan stated, ―current technology
has attained a level of sophistication where it's reasonable for us to begin this effort. It
will take years, probably decades of effort on many fronts.‖69 Much like President John
F. Kennedy‘s bold proclamation on May 25, 1961, of the goal of landing a man on the
moon, President Reagan announced only the first steps of the massive effort to follow: ―I
am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and
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development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat
posed by strategic nuclear missiles.‖70
The general idea for the Strategic Defense Initiative had formed in Reagan‘s mind
while he was merely a Presidential hopeful in 1979. Reagan was among a small
contingent of visitors to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
under Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. After being impressed by the technology
represented by the tracking systems and security procedures, an unknown individual
among the visitors asked the base commander what would be done in response to a
nuclear attack against the United States. The reply was that the missiles could only be
tracked and warnings issued; there was no defense available. Martin Anderson, one of
Reagan‘s policy advisors who was present on the occasion, described Reagan‘s mood on
the flight back to Los Angeles: ―He [Reagan] slowly shook his head and said, ‗We have
spent all that money and have all that equipment and there is nothing we can do to
prevent a nuclear missile from hitting us.‘‖ Reagan contemplated the dilemma
throughout the flight, and had resolved by the time the aircraft landed, ―We should have
some way of defending ourselves against nuclear missiles.‖71
Unfortunately for President Reagan, the vagaries of timing resulted in his use of
the phrase ―evil empire‖ and revealing a plan for space-based defenses at nearly the same
time as Return of the Jedi opened in theatres nationwide. Much to President Reagan‘s
chagrin, the nickname ―Star Wars‖ was applied to his Strategic Defense Initiative by
certain members of Congress and the media. Senator Ted Kennedy is widely believed to
have first used the term on the Senate floor, accusing the President of ―employing Red70
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scare tactics and reckless ‗Star Wars‘ schemes.‖ This quote was disseminated nationally
in the Washington Post on March 24, 1983.72 The nickname was accepted by the vast
majority of the population, and subconsciously a strong theme of science-fiction fantasy
was attached to SDI, marking one of very few communications failures of the so-called
―Great Communicator.‖ When asked his opinion of the appellation in 1985, President
Reagan confirmed that he disliked it. The nickname was ―first used in an effort to
denigrate the whole idea,‖ he explained, describing it as the ―sound of an image of
destruction back and forth‖ that was incompatible with his vision of a purely defensive
system intended to prevent just such destruction.73
Reagan intended his rhetorical campaign to strengthen the position of the United
States and thereby increase the likelihood of successful negotiations with the Soviets; the
actual result was to spur the paranoia of the Soviet Union. The strong words of Reagan‘s
first news conference provoked a complaint from Ambassador Dobrynin, who expressed
his concern that such an ―unprecedented and unprovoked statement‖ would ―undoubtedly
make a most unfavorable impression‖ in Moscow. Dobrynin wondered, ―How is he
going to do business with us?‖ Alexander Haig, President Reagan‘s first Secretary of
State, explained that Reagan had not intended to be confrontational and had just been
expressing his own beliefs and opinions. Knowing how Soviet leaders equated their
personal perspectives with state policy, Dobrynin responded that this explanation only
made things worse.74 By applying the language of morality and righteousness, President
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Reagan articulated a foreign policy he could be proud of, but neglected to consider how
the Soviets would feel about being demonized.
Two men rose to power within two years of each other, each owing a significant
portion of his success to how firmly he opposed the other. Each brought his
preconceived notions of the duplicity and aggression of the other, and an urge to increase
his own relative strength. General Secretary Andropov was guided by his absolute belief
in Marxism-Leninism and his experiences chasing dissidents, and President Reagan was
influenced by his faith in Christianity and his interactions with the House Un-American
Activities Commission in the late 1940s. The conflicts between such diametrically
opposed leaders were inevitable, and began in early 1983.

30

CHAPTER 3
THE FIRST CRISIS
While the focus on the world‘s tensions was on Europe and the missiles to be
deployed there, the United States was flexing its muscles in the northwest Pacific without
significant fanfare. In February 1983, the massive aircraft carrier USS Enterprise and its
battle group participated in the annual joint U.S.-South Korean exercise ―Team Spirit.‖
Upon completion of the exercise, the Enterprise group made port in Japan. It departed
Japan on March 25, apparently bound for the United States. Instead, the Enterprise
sailed northward to meet the carriers Midway and Coral Sea with their respective escorts
to conduct FleetEx 83-1. In total, the combination of the three carrier battle groups
comprised ―the largest fleet exercise conducted by the Pacific Fleet since World War II,‖
according to Admiral Robert Long, the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in the
Pacific (CINCPAC). Additionally, the conglomeration of approximately forty ships,
complete with 23,000 crewmembers and 300 aircraft, was the most powerful naval
armada ever assembled.75
For about two weeks, the ships and sailors of FleetEx 83-1 swept counterclockwise through the North Pacific, within a few minutes flight of the Soviet coast. U.S.
aircraft and ships attempted to provoke their Soviet counterparts into reacting, allowing
U.S. Naval Intelligence to study Soviet radar characteristics, aircraft capabilities, and
tactical maneuvers.76 In an article in the Far Eastern Economic Review, the unspoken
intent of this exercise was stated quite succinctly: ―In classical naval theory, a
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demonstration of this kind shows your prospective opponent that he is outclassed off his
own coastline and had better stick close to home in he knows what is good for him.‖77
As the exercise approached its conclusion, the USS Midway performed a
particularly intimidating maneuver. All electronic emissions were shut off, and the ship
sailed quietly toward the Kurile Islands. Without an electronic signal to track, the only
way the Soviets could have known its location would be by direct visible observation,
which they did not have. When the Midway reappeared southeast of Kamchatka, the
Soviets were ―clearly surprised.‖ On April 4, the exercise escalated again when at least
six U.S. Navy aircraft flew over one of the Kuriles. 78 The particular island in question,
known as Zelyoni to the Soviets and Habomai-Shoto to the Japanese, is only about ten
square miles and is the largest of a set of islands called the Habomai Rocks, within
twenty miles of Japanese territory (see Figure 1: ―Japan-USSR: Northern Territories‖).
There was virtually nothing on the island except a small Red Army outpost. The Soviets
were outraged, and ordered a retaliatory overflight of U.S. territory in the Aleutian
Islands. The Soviet Union also issued a demarche, a formal diplomatic note of protest,
which accused the United States of repeated penetrations of Soviet airspace.79
The Kurile Islands had been occupied by the Soviet Union since World War II,
despite several of them being claimed by Japan. This disagreement over the legitimate
owner of the islands added a layer of political intrigue to the military exercise. Had the
jets flown over established Soviet territory, the issue could have been handled much more
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Figure 1: Central Intelligence Agency, "Japan-USSR: Northern Territories," 1988.
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easily. If the U.S. State Department issued an apology or even an explanation to the
Soviet Union regarding the overflight, it would have been a tacit recognition of the
sovereignty of the Soviet Union over the Kuriles. The State Department could not
suggest that the overflight had been accidental without implying that the U.S. Navy was
incapable of finding its location on a map, and could not assert that the overflight had
been intentional without admitting to a potentially provocative act. The U.S. State
Department was content to leave the questions unanswered, as one official admitted: ―We
never got an answer [from the Navy] and we didn‘t want to know. It could have been
either one—a deliberate or accidental overflight. We wanted to stay away from the
sovereignty issue.‖80
The outcome of this territorial imbroglio was as unclear as its beginnings. More
than three weeks after the Soviets issued their demarche, on April 29, the State
Department‘s Office of Soviet Union Affairs, directed by Thomas W. Simons, Jr., met
with the Soviet embassy‘s Oleg Sokolov. The United States replied with a concise twoparagraph message that was fairly insubstantial. The Soviet‘s demarche was called
―inappropriate,‖ because ―the United States fully respects the requirements of
international law and the safety of aircraft operations, and affirms that its policy is to
avoid intrusions into Soviet airspace.‖ The U.S. State Department then issued its own
protest over the Soviet‘s Aleutian Islands airspace intrusion. The real message of this
meeting was nonverbal, and may not have been accurately received. The U.S. protest
was issued with what has been described as ―a smirk and a quizzical shrug.‖ According
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to one of the State Department diplomats present, ―We were trying to say, ‗It won‘t
happen again.‘ I‘m not sure Sokolov got the message.‖81
In his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1984, Admiral
James Watkins advocated pressuring the Soviet Union even more:
Our feeling is that an aggressive defense, if you will, characterized by
forward movement, early deployment of forces, aggressiveness on the part
of our ships, is the greatest deterrent that we can have. And the Soviets
really understand that. We can get their attention with that concept….
We can make a difference. Kamchatka is a difficult peninsula. They have
no railroads to it. They have to resupply it by air. It is a very important
spot for them, and they are naked as a jaybird there, and they know it.82
The Soviet leadership was indeed aware of the vulnerability in their Far East Military
District, and was significantly distressed by the increased activity of the U.S. Navy so
near the home of the Soviet Pacific Fleet.
The Soviet Air Force made a valiant effort at responding to the efforts of the U.S.
Navy, but was generally unsuccessful. The U.S. pilots knew how much time they had
before the Soviets would arrive, and were clear long before. Weeks of such taunting had
stressed the nerves of the Soviet pilots. According to Gennady Osipovich, the deputy
commander of an interceptor regiment based on Sakhalin Island, the egregious flyover of
Zelyoni Island lasted at least fifteen minutes while the island was cloaked in fog. The
failure of the Soviet pilots to detect and intercept the U.S. aircraft resulted in an official
investigation. Osipovich described the process as further increasing the level of stress at
the air base: ―After that incident, a commission flew out to the regiment and gave us a
dressing-down. They really berated us.‖83 In the future, Soviet pilots of the Far East
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Military District were determined to avoid such embarrassment, and they would have an
opportunity to put their intentions into effect five months later.
Early in the predawn hours of September 1, Korean Airlines Flight 007, a massive
Boeing 747 carrying 269 passengers and crew from New York to Seoul, lumbered
through the darkened sky. Most notable among its passengers was Congressman Larry
McDonald, a staunch anti-communist representing a conservative district in Georgia that
was home to several defense contractors. Representative McDonald was part of a
Congressional delegation bound for Seoul to attend a ceremony commemorating the
thirtieth anniversary of the United States-South Korea mutual defense treaty. His
associates flew Korean Airlines Flight 015 from Los Angeles to Seoul via Anchorage; a
flight that was so similar to Flight 007 that the passengers were able to intermingle at the
Anchorage terminal while both aircraft were prepared for the trans-Pacific leg.
Representative McDonald stayed on board KAL 007, surely asleep in his first-class
accommodations. Had he disembarked, it is likely that Representative McDonald would
have had his ticket changed to join his colleagues on Flight 015, and thereby saved his
life.84 Flight 007 took off at 4:00 AM local time in Anchorage. Four and a half hours
later, the aircraft and all aboard were destroyed by two air-to-air missiles fired from
Gennadi Osipovich‘s Sukhoi-15 interceptor.
The airliner had inarguably violated Soviet airspace. The reasons why remain
unclear and have been the subject of numerous conspiracy theories, some of which are
still held by a small but determined following. When the airliner departed Anchorage,
Alaska, where it had landed to refuel roughly halfway through its fifteen hour flight plan,
it almost immediately went off course. While the truth behind KAL-007‘s final flight
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may never be known, explaining the course the aircraft took as anything other than an
intentional violation of Soviet airspace requires an extremely unlikely, but not
impossible, confluence of mistakes.
The most plausible explanation, as postulated by amateur investigator Harold
Ewing and presented by Seymour Hersh, involves a combination of errors and intentional
deception by a previously distinguished flight crew. Flight engineer Kim Eui Dong was
the crewman responsible for programming the Inertial Navigation System. The Inertial
Navigation System is based on a series of notional waypoints that are really nothing more
than predetermined sets of coordinates. A flight plan is a sequence of segments between
waypoints selected to be as efficient as possible while still maintaining a routine track.
The coordinates for these waypoints had to be manually entered prior to each flight. In
one case, a data-entry error led to one set of coordinates being ten degrees off. When the
redundant systems noted the discrepancy in input, an error indicator would have
activated, although it would not have indicated where the fault was to be found. At this
point, the flight engineer must have demonstrated exceptional negligence by simply
canceling the reported error.85 Thereafter, all INS computers appeared to be properly
programmed. Pilot Chun Byung-in, for his part, intentionally avoided the first
programmed checkpoint in an attempt to fly more quickly and efficiently. Thus, any
warnings of course deviation would have been both expected and ignored.
Continuing his efforts to improve the efficiency of his flight path, Captain Chun
attempted to reprogram his INS, but succeeded only in changing the programmed latitude
while keeping the previously entered erroneous longitude. As a result, the airliner
maintained a flight path that was roughly parallel to its original plan, except it was bound
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directly for Seoul instead of circumventing Soviet airspace. Assuming Captain Chun did
enter his own personal flight plan information, there would no longer be any way for his
crew to recognize there was a problem. Discrepancies between observed and expected
weather, time, distance, and other minor factors would have been discounted as the
natural result of a planned deviation. In the event these deviations were observed and
were a point of concern, it would still have been highly unlikely that junior officers on
board would have questioned their captain.86
There is evidence supporting the supposition that this flight path was at least to
some extent intentionally chosen. The flight manifest and other documents produced and
filed in Anchorage clearly display discrepancies that would be difficult to explain under
any circumstances, and even more so when considering the results of those changes. If
these changes had been made deliberately, what would have been the intended result?
The Flight Release Sheet shows the last-minute cancellation of an unidentified 1,800
pounds of cargo, which could have been a factor of some recalculation, but certainly not
to the extent other documents show. As noted, the intended route was identified by a
series of notional waypoints. The distance, time, and expected fuel consumption between
each waypoint are the result of a computerized calculation factoring in the weight of the
aircraft, expected altitude, and expected weather conditions. An additional safety buffer
is added to compensate for the unforeseen, and the ensuing recommendations are usually
accepted as accurate. On this day, however, the fuel plan was drastically altered. The
computerized recommendation of 255,800 pounds was simply stricken, and new numbers
were entered by hand on the Flight Release Sheet. The crew indicated that they ordered
4,100 pounds less than the flight plan suggested, but the Weight and Balance Manifest
86
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clearly indicates that 263,700 pounds of fuel had been bunkered, 7,900 pounds more than
originally planned.87
Regardless of the reasons, KAL 007 not only entered Soviet airspace, but carried
its oblivious passengers over the Soviet ICBM testing range on the Kamchatka Peninsula
and toward the headquarters of the Soviet Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok, where roughly
one-third of the Soviet‘s nuclear submarines were based. The effect on the Soviets was a
feeling of disbelief that transitioned quickly into panic, as what they believed was a U.S.
reconnaissance plane overflew some of their most sensitive sites.
It was common for U.S. Air Force intelligence-gathering aircraft to penetrate
Soviet airspace. Typically, flights of this type followed an elliptical pattern, crossing into
Soviet territory briefly and then arcing back out well before an armed response could be
mounted. Most of these flights fell under the operation designated ―Cobra Ball,‖ an
electronic surveillance mission that collected telemetry data on Soviet radar and missile
systems.88 Because of the size of the Soviet Union, long-range missiles could be tested
entirely within their territorial boundaries. In order to monitor these tests, specially
modified U.S. Air Force RC-135s were on call to study the characteristics of these
missiles as they came down in the vicinity of the Kamchatka peninsula. Frequently, the
Cobra Ball flights required longer duration than normal and the aircraft needed to be
refueled in flight. Refueling was conducted outside Soviet radar range, so as not to
appear too provocative. On this particular night, U.S. intelligence services received
indications that a new SS-25 missile was going to be tested. A Cobra Ball mission was
rushed into the air, but no Soviet missile test occurred. After several hours on station
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without contact, the RC-135 crew reported nothing significant as they turned for home.
Unfortunately, the RC-135 was custom-built to track incredibly fast-moving objects at
great distances but had virtually no ability to detect other nearby aircraft, such as KAL
007. Soviet long-range radars had been tracking the Cobra Ball flight as fairly routine.
They saw the usual figure-eight patterns that took the aircraft into and out of radar
coverage. They saw the RC-135 leave the area for a longer than usual time, as when the
aircraft was being refueled, and they saw an aircraft reenter Soviet airspace
approximately within the area of the Cobra Ball activity. Their radar, identified by
NATO as ―Tall King,‖ was notoriously inaccurate at determining the height and size of
distant objects and would not have been able to distinguish between the U.S. Air Force
RC-135 and the Korean Airlines 747.89 It was only natural for the radar operator to
assume the target being tracked was the RC-135 as it continued through Soviet airspace.
Protivo Vozdushnoi Oborony (PVO), the Soviet air defense network, was already
strained by the paranoia endemic in the Kremlin. Should Andropov‘s Operation RYAN
fail to detect the preparations for a nuclear surprise attack, only the diligence of the radar
operators at PVO would be able to forewarn the motherland. Tension and frustration
grew together in air defense headquarters as multiple interceptors simply failed to find
the target. Donald Zagoria, a Soviet-affairs expert from Hunter College in New York,
postulated in Newsweek magazine that Soviet air defense officers were goaded onward by
fear of failure, ―nobody wants to take responsibility for letting out an intruding plane.‖90
An SA-5 surface-to-air missile battery on Sakhalin Island was placed on alert. At 3:12
AM, the Su-15 pilot finally reported visual contact with KAL 007. ―I saw two rows of
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windows and knew that this was a Boeing. I knew this was a civilian plane. But for me
this meant nothing. It is easy to turn a civilian plane into one for military use,‖ recalled
Osipovich in December 1996. Osipovich was completely correct in this statement. The
RC-135, the type of aircraft the Soviets must have believed the aircraft to be, was in fact
a variation of the Boeing 707. Considering the basic similarities in airframe design, the
two aircraft could easily have been mistaken for one another. The obvious indicators
would be the four-engine configuration, the wings based at the bottom of the fuselage,
and the tapering tail. Given that the encounter occurred at night, the Soviet pilots
intercepting the aircraft would have had no frame of reference for distinguishing the size
of the target. Only the 747‘s unique ―hump‖ at the forward end of the top of the fuselage
would have conclusively indicated that a mistake had been made.
Three minutes after Osipovich claimed visual contact, the airline pilot routinely
reported his position to Tokyo air controllers and requested permission to climb to 35,000
ft. A corresponding message from the Soviet fighter confirms the aircraft rose at that
point, passing through 33,000 ft six minutes later. At this point, radar operators in
Hokkaido became aware of the discrepancy. KAL-007 had reported its location as 115
miles south of Hokkaido, but their radar signature was 115 miles north of Hokkaido.91
These same radar operators also saw the radar signature of an unidentified aircraft
approach and merge with the signal known to be KAL-007 at 3:25 AM. The fighter fired
warning shots from its machine gun, but may not have been loaded with any illuminating
tracer rounds, making it virtually impossible for its warning to have been seen. No
messages of distress were received by Japanese air traffic control until after KAL-007
had been hit by the Su-15‘s missile, when an unintelligible garble marked KAL-007‘s last
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communication. Ground radars tracked the slow descent of the 269 passengers and crew
members of KAL-007 for twelve hellish minutes before losing the signal below the
horizon.92
The Soviets never denied the act, nor did they claim it had been a tragic mistake.
Instead, they made no immediate statement. One Soviet spokesman later dismissed the
international outcry as ―hullabaloo‖ and blamed the United States and the Central
Intelligence Agency for using a civilian airliner full of innocent travelers as a spy
mission.93 Anatoly Kornukov, the officer who ordered Osipovich to fire, said in 1998, ―I
will always be sure that the order was given correctly.‖ On September 10, 1983, the
Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov held a press conference in Moscow
explaining the Soviet action. ―The conclusion was made at Soviet anti-aircraft command
posts: an intelligence aircraft is approaching the Soviet Union‘s airspace,‖ Marshal
Ogarkov explained. ―How can this be a question of a mistake in this case? It is perfectly
evident that this aircraft‘s flight was controlled, I would say precisely controlled. And
therefore this flight was premeditated.‖94 This argument is based on two key
assumptions. In the first place, it assumed the aircraft was on an intelligence-gathering
mission. Second, it assumed that because the flight was controlled it was where it
intended to be.
Given the atmosphere of paranoia in the Kremlin, Soviet leaders simply could not
accept the tragedy at face value. Oleg Gordievsky, a former KGB station chief in
London who was the highest ranking KGB officer to defect, revealed that a telegram
arrived from KGB headquarters at Moscow Centre on September 4. This telegram
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indicated that the shoot-down of KAL 007 was being used by the Reagan administration
for propaganda purposes to foment anti-Soviet sentiment worldwide.95 Soviet leaders
may have believed that KAL 007 really was on a spy mission for the CIA, and projected
an air of indifference to the loss. They even went so far as to investigate the backgrounds
of the passengers, looking for connections to intelligence services.96 Once they had leapt
to this conclusion, Soviet leaders were able to see other evidence pointing to a conspiracy
against them. The scathing indictment from the Reagan Administration arrived in
Moscow nearly as quickly as initial investigation reports from the North Pacific, and the
use of the incident as anti-Soviet propaganda made the Soviets more confident in their
assessment:
This conclusion is confirmed by all subsequent actions of the U.S.
administration. Its leaders, including the U.S. president in person,
launched a malicious and hostile anti-Soviet campaign over a very short
time, clearly using a prearranged script. Its essence has been revealed in
its concentrated form in the televised speech of U.S. president R. Reagan
on September 5—to try to blacken the image of the Soviet Union.97
The Soviet Union faced condemnation from all sides as the world lost patience
with its stance. President Reagan focused the response with his address of September 5.
Reagan summarized the situation from the U.S. perspective, with personal commentary:
―It was an act of barbarism, born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights
and the value of human life and seeks constantly to expand and dominate other
nations.‖98 The world began to see that Reagan‘s fierce invective about the ―evil empire‖
may have been more accurate than they ever imagined. The Canadian government and
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the International Federation of Airline Pilots‘ Associations supported a ban on flights by
the Soviet Union‘s national airline, Aeroflot. The United States had already banned
Aeroflot after the invasion of Afghanistan, but strongly urged other countries to deny
Aeroflot access. Canada‘s threat carried special weight, as Aeroflot‘s Cuban flights
regularly refueled at Gander International Airport in Labrador, and the loss of this
privilege would have been politically embarrassing. Several countries were reluctant to
commit to the ban, but the symbolic sentiment of condemnation was intact.99
Tryggvi McDonald, son of Congressman Larry McDonald, spoke at a rally in
Washington on September 7. Timed to coincide with the official memorial service in
Seoul, which was attended by more than 100,000 people, this rally was so vehement that
an effigy of Andropov was burned on the sidewalk in front of the White House.100 In
New York, Soviet flags were burned in front of the United Nations building.101 Both
Newsweek and Time ran sensationalistic covers that further enflamed the American
general public, while NBC-TV aired a special report titled ―Shot from the Sky.‖102 More
than 3,500 people attended the memorial service for Congressman McDonald in
Washington, where some speakers derided President Reagan‘s ―tame response.‖103 One
Congressman, Philip Crane of Illinois, was reported by the Los Angeles Times referring
to those responsible for the shoot-down as ―psychopathic subhumans. They are obscene.
They violate the laws of God and nature.‖104 South Korean ambassador to the United
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States, Lew Byong Hion, pushed for a tougher response from President Reagan.105 For
the Reagan administration, the downing of KAL 007 provided the political impetus to
push forward several defense-related programs, including an overall defense budget that
was a 22 percent increase over the previous year and included such divisive issues as the
production of the MX missile and the development of a new nerve gas weapon
designated ―Bigeye.‖ The latter overturned President Richard Nixon‘s pledge of 1969 to
end chemical weapons production.106 President Reagan asked that Congress ―ponder
long and hard the Soviets‘ aggression as they consider the security and safety of our
people, indeed all people who believe in freedom.‖107 For the ardent anti-communists
that made up the core of Reagan‘s supporters, this was not nearly enough.
The president that had been staunchly in the right wing of American politics for
more than thirty years found himself in the unexpected position of struggling to soothe
anti-Soviet sentiment. During the previous administration, he had criticized Carter‘s
grain embargo and negotiated a new deal only months before the KAL 007 incident.
Although pressured to do so, the administration understood that cancelling the contract
would subject Reagan to the same criticisms he had made of Carter and have a disastrous
impact on the market price of grain and, by extension, the American farmers who grew it.
Even without an official statement on the subject, the expectation that the contract would
be cancelled caused significant disruption to the prices of grain and soya.108 Reagan had
the option of cancelling a contract between the Soviet Union and the Caterpillar Tractor
Company, but knew that there were other corporations capable of filling the order, such
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as Japan‘s Komatsu.109 The final result would be more damaging to American business
than Soviet prestige. Another factor Reagan had to consider was the emplacement of the
Pershing II and ground-based cruise missiles in Europe. An overly harsh response from
the Reagan White House could endanger the arms-control talks, resulting in European
opinion turning against those missiles.110 Reagan sought to elevate the power and
prestige of the United States relative to the Soviet Union and thereby strengthen his
negotiating position. With the world‘s outrage focused on Moscow, he realized that
objective. Further pressure on the Soviets would likely only provoke their obstinacy and
intransigence.
Soviet leaders in turn worried that the KAL 007 incident would become a rallying
point for the United States, as the destruction of the USS Maine had encouraged the
Spanish-American War and the sinking of the RMS Lusitania had helped move President
Woodrow Wilson into World War I. Andrei Gromyko, Soviet foreign minister from
1957 to 1985, described a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz on
September 8 as more of a confrontation. ―It was probably the sharpest exchange I ever
had with an American Secretary of State, and I have had talks with fourteen of them.‖111
Shultz greeted Gromyko with no smile and no handshake, and angry outbursts were
reported from both sides of the table.112 This increase in tensions fit perfectly into the
paranoia of the Soviet leadership, who believed nuclear war would not be an abrupt
surprise but would come as a result of uncontrollable escalation. General Secretary
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Andropov characterized the United States as pursuing ―dangerous, inhuman policies‖ and
a ―militarist course that poses a grave threat to peace.‖113
Three weeks after President Reagan denounced the Soviets as ―inhuman,‖
―barbaric,‖ and ―provocative‖ because their air defense branch severely overreacted to a
possible threat, PVO was again at center stage. In the early morning hours of September
26, the Soviet‘s surveillance satellites reported to ―Serpukhov-15,‖ the secret control
bunker 55 miles from Moscow, that they had detected the launch of five Minuteman II
intercontinental ballistic missiles.114 According to the ―Oko‖ (―Eye‖), as the satellite
system was known, the prophesied surprise nuclear attack had begun.
Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov was the officer in charge on that particular
night, and only through his hesitation was the world spared nuclear holocaust. The ―Eye‖
was reporting the distinctive heat signatures, called ―thermal blooms,‖ of launches in the
vicinity of known Minuteman II silos in Montana. Lt. Col. Petrov struggled to
understand; his training and common sense told him that a nuclear war would begin with
a massive first-strike. He should have seen hundreds of missiles approaching from
perhaps dozens of locations as U.S. strategic forces tried to overcome the defenses of
population centers and missile sites to destroy their targets before Soviets could mount an
organized response. Lt. Col. Petrov had written the response plan himself and knew just
how little time he had to notify his superiors of the impending attack. The Oko system
reported launch signals, but corresponding radar systems could not provide useful input
until the missiles had achieved enough altitude to be visible above the horizon. As radar
stations continued to report negative contact, Lt. Col. Petrov took bold action. He picked
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up the hotline to call his superiors, and reported that there was no attack. On his own
initiative, Lt. Col. Petrov determined the warning to be a false alarm and cancelled the
alert.115 "I had a funny feeling in my gut," Petrov said. "I didn't want to make a mistake. I
made a decision, and that was it."116 Even though this appeared to be the best course of
action, Lt. Col. Petrov spent the next fifteen minutes in the greatest imaginable torment.
If he had been wrong, he had doomed his country. Terror gave way to relief as the quiet
of the night continued unbroken.
An investigation of the alarm revealed that the system had observed sunlight
reflecting off clouds over the site. Thorough investigation found several other flaws in
the Oko, and also found a political trap. Alledgedly, these flaws were known when the
system was implemented in late 1982 and the operations staff was told to ignore them.
They were told the flaws would be repaired later, because it was critical to install the
system as soon as possible.117 The flaws reflected badly on the leadership who had
formulated and implemented the system, so the man who discovered the flaws when he
potentially averted nuclear war was made the scapegoat. Any significant attention, either
reward or punishment, directed toward Lt. Col. Petrov would necessarily have focused
unwanted attention on the flawed system he had been operating. Thus, he was
unofficially forgotten and transferred to a lower profile position without reward,
reprimand, or promotion. Ten years later and still a lieutenant colonel, Stanislav Petrov
retired to his only benefit from the country he served: an apartment with a telephone on
the outskirts of Moscow. It was another decade before a more fitting award was
bestowed by the Association of World Citizens, an international peace group. In 2004,
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Stanislav Petrov was given the World Citizen Award for ―a unique act of heroism that
saved the world.‖ As part of the award ceremony, Petrov was allowed to address the
General Assembly of the United Nations.118 Officially, the government of Russia has
denied that any one man played so vital a role in the prevention of nuclear war.119
The Soviet General Staff, however, did not have to wait as long as Lt. Col Petrov
to receive their rewards. As the sun rose on September 26, 1983, they knew that Pershing
II missiles would be deployed in Western Europe within sixty days and their most
sophisticated early-warning system was less than worthless.120 What should have been a
reassuring safeguard became an illustration that it could be more productive to do
nothing.
Despite being the only side to fire a shot, the Soviet Union clearly lost the first
crisis. The U.S. Navy had displayed more presence in the North Pacific than it had since
World War II, and gave the Soviet Union only perfunctory acknowledgement of an
airspace intrusion. The Soviets‘ paranoid overreaction resulted in the deaths of 269
civilians, and provoked widespread condemnation. As fears of nuclear war grew, the
Soviet leadership also learned its early-warning satellite system was flawed, and its
operators were likely to disregard protocols. Tensions continued to worsen, and a more
dangerous second crisis period began.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SECOND CRISIS
In March 1979 leftist revolutionaries on the relatively small and lightly populated
island nation of Grenada overthrew the existing government. Relations were established
with the Soviet Union and Cuba almost immediately, and a month later a shipment of
arms and ammunition arrived from Cuba along with 50 military advisors to help
strengthen the new regime. These 50 were joined by 400 more Cuban soldiers in
September, sent to help train the Grenadian army. Another 300 Cubans arrived in
December to help construct a new airport with an enormous runway capable of hosting
the world‘s largest cargo aircraft.121 As the regime solidified, support also came from
Moscow. Hudson Austin, a Grenadian general identified in President Reagan‘s diary as
the ―top villain on Grenada,‖122 wrote to Chairman of the KGB Yuri Andropov in early
1982 to thank him for the Soviet Union‘s assistance and to request training for four
Grenadian intelligence agents.123
The new airstrip construction project at Point Salines evoked particular concern in
the United States. The public purpose was to support increasing tourism, but there had
been no corresponding investment in the tourist trade in the area, no new hotels, no new
attractions.124 Design plans indicated that the Point Salines airport was not intended to be
primarily a military airfield: fuel storage facilities were above ground, and there were no
significant fortifications. This would certainly not preclude the airstrip from being used
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by military aircraft, however.125 As a result, the Reagan Administration suggested it
would be useful in the movement of Soviet or Cuban troops and materiel. According to
President Reagan, Grenada was ―a Soviet-Cuban colony being readied as a major military
bastion to export terror and undermine democracy.‖126 Ludlow Flower, the U.S. chargé
d‘affaires in Barbados, described the situation from the U.S. perspective: ―It isn‘t the
airport per se that bothers us. Lots of islands around here have airports of comparable
size. It is that the airport in Grenada was primarily financed and built by the Cubans,
who tend not to do these things out of a sense of Christian charity….‖127
The internal politics of Grenada revolved around two personalities, both of whom
considered themselves to be true Marxists. Maurice Bishop, the prime minister, was a
socialist democrat who developed a persona as a populist hero, described by some as
―Grenada‘s Che Guevara.‖ His deputy prime minister, Bernard Coard, allegedly derived
his power through support from Moscow, and buttressed his position with his skills at
organization and administration. 128 Bishop and Coard competed for dominance while
they attempted to reorganize Grenada‘s economy. Ambassador Frank Ortiz arrived in
Grenada on March 22, 1979, to discuss the support the United States would offer. Peace
Corps volunteers could be available within two weeks, and specific projects could be
funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development office on Barbados or the
Caribbean Development Bank. Additionally, the embassy had the authority to disburse
up to $5,000 for small projects from the Special Development Activities fund.129 On
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April 13, Bishop used this offer as part of his anti-United States propaganda effort. In his
first major speech, Bishop declared that Grenadans ―have always striven to develop the
closest and friendliest relations with the United States,‖ but the United States was only
willing to provide $5,000 worth of aid. Bishop went on, ―Sisters and brothers, our
hospitals are without medicines…. Is [that] all the wealthiest country in the world can
offer?‖ Furthermore, Bishop read a paper from Ambassador Ortiz that indicated the
United States would not allow Grenada to seek aid from or establish diplomatic relations
with Cuba. Bishop‘s response was unequivocal, as he announced, ―We reject entirely the
argument of the American Ambassador…. If the government of Cuba is willing to offer
us assistance, we would be more than happy to receive it.‖130 Thus Bishop aligned his
new regime with Fidel Castro‘s Cuba, and set in motion his own downfall. Coard seized
an opportunity to advance his hard-line goals by arresting Bishop on vague charges on
October 19, 1983. The population protested, and was suppressed by Coard loyalists in
Soviet tanks that had been provided by Cuba. In an attempt to defuse the situation Prime
Minister Bishop came forward to surrender. For reasons unknown, he and several
civilians in his party were summarily executed on the spot.131
Decision-makers in Washington, D.C. were left with little opportunity for
deliberation. The United States had to have a response to this bloody coup. In the words
of the New York Times, anything less than military intervention would have depicted the
United States as ―a paper tiger in the eyes of both friendly and hostile Latin American
countries.‖132 The Reagan administration felt that military intervention was necessary,
and that course of action resulted in another forced decision: the United States not only
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had to intervene, that intervention had to be spectacularly successful. The cost of failure
would have been much higher than merely the loss of Grenada to the Communist bloc. A
transition in political system in any country was significant to both the United States and
the Soviet Union. To some extent, both sides recognized the ―domino theory‖ as it had
been articulated by President Dwight Eisenhower.133 In a meeting in Grenada‘s embassy
in Moscow on March 10, 1983, Soviet Chief of the General Staff Marshall Nikolai
Ogarkov said, ―Over two decades ago, there was only Cuba in Latin America, today there
are Nicaragua, Grenada, and a serious battle is going on in El Salvador.‖ 134 The Soviet
Union clearly hoped that Grenada was but one of many ―island dominoes‖ to fall its way.
President Reagan was cognizant of another aspect of the Grenada situation that
could have catastrophic symbolic impact: at the time of Coard‘s coup there were roughly
600 American citizens enrolled in St. George‘s University School of Medicine.135 These
American citizens were potentially in mortal danger from the comprehensive curfew
declared by General Austin. No civilians were authorized to be outside their homes, and
the penalty for violation was death.136 The revolutionary government of Grenada had
made assurances that the students would not be injured, but those assurances were given
by people who had undoubtedly not expected Prime Minister Bishop and his entourage to
be murdered in the streets. The potential for a reenactment of the Iran hostage crisis that
had been so damaging to President Carter and the prestige of the United States was
immediately evident. President Reagan wanted to restore the image of the United States
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abroad, and knew that he faced disaster if he was held powerless by a small group of
Marxist fanatics on an otherwise relatively insignificant island.137
An impression of failure and impotence clung to the U.S. military following the
unsatisfactory resolution of the Vietnam War and the abject failure of Operation Eagle
Claw, the mission to rescue the American hostages held in Iran. U.S. Armed Forces
appeared incompetent, unready, and unreliable in the early 1980s.138 Another loss would
further degrade the prestige of the U.S. military and weaken foreign policy regarding
hostile states. Given the location of Grenada, the United States could bring to bear
overwhelming military power relatively easily with success all but guaranteed. The
expected result for the United States was demonstrated primacy in the Caribbean and a
national feeling of self-respect and self-confidence, much like the United Kingdom had
felt following its successful intervention in the Falklands. Events on another sea, the
Mediterranean, further reinforced the call to arms. On October 23, a truck loaded with
explosives detonated in Beirut, killing 241 U.S. Marines, the most casualties suffered in
one day by the United States since the Vietnam War.139 President Reagan struggled with
the decision to send more troops into harm‘s way, but the final determination was made
while considering the two operations separately. Reagan told his advisors, ―If this was
right yesterday, it‘s right today, and we shouldn‘t let the act of a couple of terrorists
dissuade us from going ahead.‖140 President Reagan believed the United States needed a
powerful show of force as soon as possible.
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On the evening of October 24, the order was issued for Operation Urgent Fury to
commence the next morning. Nearly 6,000 U.S. combat troops, with roughly 14,000
more in supporting roles, selected from some of the most elite units of the U.S. Armed
Forces and accompanied by more than one hundred helicopters, would meet an opposing
force of some 1,500 underpaid, underequipped, undertrained Grenadian regulars.141 The
results were predictable, even given the underachievement the U.S. military had
displayed in the previous thirty years, and the campaign was officially concluded on
November 2.142
Grenada itself was certainly no great prize in the world struggle, but the symbolic
value of victory there had a significant impact on the prestige of the Reagan
administration, and bolstered the morale of anti-communists. According to one Reagan
Administration official, ―Grenada showed that it could be done. [The U.S. invasion]
proved that boldness and determination could defeat the Communists.‖143 The success of
Urgent Fury was the linchpin of a strategy that became known as the Reagan Doctrine, a
directive ―to nourish and defend freedom and democracy and to communicate these ideas
everywhere we can,‖ and to support ―those fighting for freedom against communism
wherever we find them.‖144 The swiftness and thoroughness of the invasion also led to a
wealth of information, both in the form of internal documentation and captured Warsaw
Pact weapons materiel. Although these documents provided little exploitable
intelligence, pertaining as they did to a toppled regime, the propaganda victory was real.
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Figure 2: United States Military Academy. ―Invasion of Grenada by U.S. and Caribbean Nations,‖ 1983.
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Mark Adkin, a retired British infantry officer and Barbados Defense Force Caribbean
Operations officer who participated in the planning and execution of the intervention,
described the intelligence coup: ―Never before had a Western power been given such
access to the secret workings of a communist state through its own papers.‖145 The true
importance of these documents was in their support of President Reagan‘s assertions.
Many of these documents were displayed at Andrews Air Force Base for journalists‘
perusal. President Reagan remarked bitterly in his autobiography, ―reporters would have
found evidence of everything we were saying. But very few did. Instead, for several
days, most of the news commentators focused on claims that the landings in Grenada had
been reckless.‖146 A selection of these documents was also collected and published in
1984 as The Grenada Papers.
Public opinion in the United States, which had been ambivalent before the
invasion, was jubilant afterward. Television cameras showed returning students from St.
George‘s University School of Medicine disembark their airplane and express their joy at
being back in the United States by kneeling down to kiss the tarmac.147 At a ceremony
held at the White House, about 400 of the rescued medical students met with 40 of the
soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines who had taken part in Urgent Fury. President
Reagan recorded the event in his autobiography: ―When some of the students later came
to the White House and embraced the soldiers who had rescued them, it was quite a sight
for a former governor who had once seen college students spit on anyone wearing a
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military uniform.‖ President Reagan described the occasion in his diary as ―the most
wonderful South Lawn ceremony we‘ve ever had.‖148
The planning and execution of Urgent Fury was far from flawless, with numerous
opportunities for disaster to befall U.S. personnel. For the most part, those potential
disasters were avoided due to either the exceptional efforts of U.S. small-unit leaders or
the general ineptitude of their Grenadian opposition. In cases where the difficulties in the
field proved to be insurmountable, the lessons learned resulted in changed policies.
Despite those flaws, overall strategic goals were met: the revolutionary regime was
overthrown, key individuals were captured, U.S. persons and interests were protected,
and potential communist expansion in the Caribbean was thwarted.
For his part, President Reagan kept his word to the American public and his
troops when he dealt a final blow to the inevitable comparisons with Vietnam. Instead of
becoming mired in a protracted conflict pursuing an ideological insurgency, U.S. forces
were withdrawn as soon as the Grenadian government was restored. The invasion and
occupation had taken less than two months, and U.S. combat troops were home by
Christmas.149 Exploitation of the captured documents confirmed what President Reagan
had said, that ―we got there just in time.‖ The planned armament of Grenada detailed in
the documents suggested that, in as little as two more years, an invasion like Urgent Fury
would have been much less successful.150 While it is unlikely that Grenada would have
ever been in a position to pose a direct threat to the United States, the revolutionary
government of Coard had been moving toward a militarized garrison state. In a speech to
the Congressional Medal of Honor Society on December 12, President Reagan concisely
148
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described the state of the U.S. Armed Forces: ―Our days of weakness are over. Our
military forces are back on their feet and standing tall.‖151 For the U.S. military, the
return from the abyss of Vietnam had begun.
The Soviet Union‘s view of Grenada was similar to that of the United States:
Grenada was more important symbolically than literally. Many historians, including
John Diggins, have argued that Grenada was wholly unnecessary to the Soviet Union, at
best a second, redundant Cuba.152 This perspective does not consider evidence from the
documents recovered during the aftermath of Urgent Fury. The documents published as
The Grenada Papers reinforced the assessment that the Soviet Union supported
Grenada‘s Marxists as an expansion of worldwide Communism.153 Grenada was not a
duplicate Cuba, but another comrade in the anti-imperialist socialist revolution. The
Soviet Union interpreted the U.S. intervention in Grenada as a possible template for
future counter-revolutionary activities. Similar invasions of Cuba or Nicaragua could be
forthcoming, or even anti-Communist attacks worldwide.154 The Soviet Union
understood the statement that had been made by the Grenada invasion: the United States
would not only wage an arms race of sophisticated technology, but also employ its armed
forces directly to combat communism. Andropov‘s suspicions of the United States
appeared to be validated, and U.S.-Soviet relations became even more strained.
Adding to the belief that U.S. operations in Grenada were a rehearsal for larger
actions, there was a significant surge in ciphered communications between London and
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Washington. This had been identified by the KGB as an indicator of impending nuclear
attack. In reality, the messages were notes of protest. Queen Elizabeth II and Prime
Minister Thatcher were outraged that Britain‘s closest ally would conduct an armed
invasion of a Commonwealth member without British support.155 This intervention was
interpreted so seriously in Moscow that Soviet Vice-President Vasili Kuznetsov accused
President Reagan of ―making delirious plans for world domination‖ and ―pushing
mankind to the brink of disaster.‖156
Far from the Caribbean battleground, NATO forces in Europe were preparing for
Able Archer ‘83. Able Archer was one of several annual NATO exercises that replicated
the outbreak of hostilities in Europe between the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces. It had
not been particularly interesting in previous years, and was not expected by most U.S.
analysts to be noteworthy in 1983. In the Soviet Union, however, alarm was spreading
throughout the senior leadership.
The 1983 iteration of Able Archer was in keeping with President Reagan‘s
intention to improve the U.S. military‘s readiness and capability. More extensive and
encompassing than ever before, Able Archer ‘83 was originally planned to include roles
for Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the supreme
commander of NATO, and even extended to Vice-President Bush and President Reagan
themselves. The first sign that anyone in the United States began to recognize the true
degree of threat the Soviets were feeling was the reduction of the scale of Able Archer
‘83, apparently at the urging of National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane.157
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The reduced-scale Able Archer ‘83 was what is known as a ―command-post
exercise.‖ Exercises of this type are a rehearsal of command and control procedures
more than actual troop movements. Able Archer ‘83, intended to simulate nothing less
than World War III, included the release of intermediate-range ballistic missiles such as
the Pershing II. In reality, the Pershing II systems had not yet been fully fielded, so the
roles of Pershing II units were played hypothetically. Notional Pershing II units and realworld infantry and armor units intermingled in the exercise, but only in concept and not
execution.158
The report of Pershing II units in the field ahead of schedule and the lack of
visible signs of major troop movements shocked the Soviets, who assumed that they were
the victims of an elaborate operation of deception. The Pershing IIs were expected to
arrive in Europe within weeks, so the early delivery of some systems was not
inconceivable. ―Even a single Pershing II armed with a ‗third generation‘ nuclear
weapon… could paralyze strategic communications in Moscow and beyond with a
powerful electromagnetic pulse. One Pershing II, or a few, secretly smuggled into
Western Europe for a surprise attack during Able Archer, could in the Soviet view tip the
strategic balance.‖159
Soviet intelligence services, already whipped into a frenzy by the paranoid
directives of Operation RYAN, took note of every anomaly. Intercepts of NATO
communications revealed unfamiliar message formats and procedures, which were
interpreted as an attempt to disguise the real intent of NATO forces. One of the tenets of
the exercise was to elevate NATO nuclear forces to DEFCON 1, the level at which
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nuclear war would be conducted. At this level, the safety mechanisms preventing nuclear
launch would have been disabled. The DEFCON 1 order was only for exercise purposes,
but it is unclear whether or not the Soviets understood that, or if they believed it.160 KGB
officials reasoned that the Able Archer exercise would be an excellent cover for a nuclear
first strike; preparations could be carried out in full view of the Soviet Union as long as
they were masked as an exercise.161 A detailed KGB directive from February 17, 1983,
part of Operation RYAN, suggested just such an eventuality: preparatory measures were
―to be carried out with the utmost secrecy (under the guise of maneuvers, training, etc.) in
the shortest possible time.‖162
On November 6, KGB headquarters in Moscow issued another warning about the
intent of the United States to launch a nuclear missile attack. In order to be effective, a
nuclear attack must be such a surprise that the opponent is unable to launch a retaliatory
strike. Based on this premise, the KGB asserted, ―it can be assumed that the period of
time from the moment the preliminary decision for [surprise nuclear missile attack] is
taken, up to the order to deliver the strike, will be very short duration, possibly 7 - 10
days.‖ If Able Archer ‘83 was intended to be a cover for the initiation of nuclear war, the
KGB predicted it could begin in as little as three to six days.163 With so little time left,
Soviet officials demanded an ever-increasing flow of information. Any irregularity was
scrutinized and used to justify suspicions. The Soviet intelligence apparatus was caught
in a self-escalating cycle, culminating in the order to alert their own nuclear forces.
Nuclear-capable attack aircraft in East Germany were placed on stand-by, and strategic
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forces across the Soviet Union were likely alerted as well. Soviet standard procedures in
such circumstances were to move fueled aircraft into position for take-off, recall essential
personnel from leave, increase base security, and review classified war plans. The alert
would have been disseminated throughout the Soviet defense apparatus, from the Chief
of the General Staff to the many base security guards.164
In the midst of Able Archer ‘83, the Soviet General Staff‘s attention was
distracted from events in Western Europe by another potential indicator of an impending
nuclear attack. Soviet nuclear attack submarines routinely patrolled along known transit
routes of U.S. nuclear missile submarines. In a wartime environment, the attack
submarines would deploy their nuclear torpedoes to destroy the missile submarines
before they could vanish into the quiet depths or launch their payloads. In a peacetime
scenario, the Soviets would track and target the U.S. boats in the same manner, stopping
short of actually firing any weapons. Similarly, U.S. anti-submarine efforts attempted to
target those Soviet attack submarines, hoping to provide safe passage for the missile
submarines. In order to develop a clear image of the undersea world, sonar arrays are
often towed behind a boat or ship, providing distance between the sonar device and the
noises generated by the craft itself.
Around November 4, Soviet Victor III class attack submarine K-324 somehow
became fouled in the towed sonar array of the U.S. Navy frigate USS McCloy.165 The
submarine was forced to surface, less than 500 miles off the coast of Charleston, South
Carolina, and in full view of the U.S. Navy antisubmarine crews that had been tracking
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it.166 The Soviet General Staff was aghast. Not only was their submarine fleet quickly
becoming a laughingstock as their boat was towed for four days toward Cuba on the
surface, but they had lost their coverage of the American ballistic missile submarines and
any knowledge of where those boats may be.167 The fact that K-324 was able to retain
control of an unknown amount of USS McCloy‘s sonar array and deliver it to the Soviet
Navy at Cienfuegos, Cuba was small comfort to the Kremlin.168 Soviet commanders
were all too aware that they had lost the ability to track U.S. ballistic missile submarines,
feared to be destined to participate in the surprise nuclear missile attack that would begin
at the conclusion of Able Archer ‘83.
Able Archer ‘83 continued as planned until its conclusion on November 11, with
its NATO participants completely unaware of the escalating threat in the Soviet Union.
If the United States had been aware of the Soviet alert, there would certainly have been
some type of diplomatic outreach to defuse the situation as it was happening, an early end
to the exercise, or a leak to the press afterwards that accused the Soviets of dangerous
warmongering. A National Intelligence Estimate produced in March 1984 titled Soviet
Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict, 1983-1993 did not reference the event,
suggesting the true danger was not yet understood four months after the incident.
Another National Intelligence Estimate, Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political
Activities, produced in May 1984, clearly referenced the Soviet alert, but dismissed it as
propaganda: ―Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war … has been
deliberately manipulated to rationalize military efforts with domestic audiences and to
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influence Western political elites. Some Soviet military activities have also been
designed to have an alarming or intimidating effect.‖169
Based on the timelines provided by the KGB that predicted NATO‘s surprise
attack, Able Archer ‘83 ended with little time to spare. Cold War historian and former
CIA officer Dr. Peter Pry suggested that ―if Able Archer ‘83 had continued, perhaps even
by as little as another twenty-four hours, the West might have unwittingly stumbled into a
nuclear holocaust.‖
The Soviet Union perceived the invasion of Grenada as a precursor to possible
future military interventions elsewhere in the communist sphere, and feared that Able
Archer ‘83 was just such an operation disguised as an exercise. The failure of its
submarine to maintain contact with the U.S. Navy‘s ballistic missile submarines provided
the United States with just the opportunity the Soviet Union feared. During the second
crisis of 1983, KGB colonel and British informant Oleg Gordievsky, the highest ranking
KGB officer ever to defect, asserted that the world ―had without knowing it, come
frighteningly close – certainly closer than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis‖ to
nuclear war.170
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CHAPTER 5
PERCEPTIONS AND DEPICTIONS
Adding to the significance of this chronology of potentially provocative events
was the manner in which the Soviet Union perceived those events. Soviet leaders looked
at the world through ―Marxism-Leninism-tinted glasses‖ and forced the world to fit their
theoretical models. Marxism-Leninism predicted that imperialist capitalist
socioeconomic systems were destined to fail. By the 1980s, those who were alive during
the Bolshevik Revolution were nearing the ends of their lives. The expectation of seeing
their prophecy fulfilled led Soviet leaders to believe the collapse of the United States was
imminent. It was anticipated in the Kremlin that U.S. leaders had come to the same
conclusion, and might become desperate and unstable. In a document summarizing the
efforts of the KGB in 1982 and 1983, this perspective was overtly stated:
One of the reasons for the increased aggressiveness of imperialism, especially
American imperialism, is the deepening economic and social crisis in the
capitalist world. The slowing down in the growth rates for industrial production,
together with continuing technological progress, have led to permanent mass
unemployment and to exacerbation of other social problems. The prospect of a
worsening of these trends is frightening the imperialists. They are seeking an
escape from the difficulties they have created in their own ways, including that of
war.171
Based on its ideological doctrine, the Soviet Union was predisposed to interpret the
statements and actions of capitalist powers as threatening, and as 1983 drew to a close, it
was apparent to the Soviet Union that it was besieged on all sides.
Soviet covert intelligence had been thwarted in its ability to determine the secret
surprise nuclear attack plans. American nuclear missiles were being installed in
Germany that could reach Moscow before sufficient alarm could be raised. The
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American president had declared the Soviet Union to be the target of a righteous crusade.
The United States even had ―space bombers‖ on hand to rain death down on the
motherland. American military power was at its highest level in decades, whereas Soviet
equipment had been demonstrated to be unreliable and Soviet personnel had dared to
defy standing orders. The foreign intelligence plan for 1984, distributed throughout KGB
offices in November 1983 stated, ―The threat of an outbreak of nuclear war is reaching an
extremely dangerous position. The United States is involving its NATO allies and Japan
in pursuing its aggressive designs.‖172 Since this document would have been closely
guarded and intended for internal use only, there was no need for propagandist hyperbole.
This statement represented the mentality of Soviet leadership in the closing weeks of
1983.
One of the most dangerous aspects of the crisis of 1983 was the nearly complete
failure of the United States to recognize there was a crisis. President Reagan was aware
that Moscow was beginning to feel cornered, but did not fully appreciate the intensity of
those feelings. In his autobiography, Reagan described the surprise he felt over what he
had learned about the Soviets‘ perspective after three years in the White House: ―Many
people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and
Americans. Perhaps this shouldn‘t have surprised me, but it did. In fact, I had difficulty
accepting my own conclusion at first.‖173 As NATO forces carried out Able Archer ‘83,
British agent and KGB Colonel Oleg Gordievsky became increasingly agitated. CIA
historian Fritz Ermarth characterized Gordievsky as ―disturbed by the trend of events and
the atmospherics,‖ and angry that his reporting was apparently not being taken seriously
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in London and Washington.174 In his diary entry of November 18, Reagan wrote ―I feel
the Soviets are so defense minded, so paranoid about being attacked that without being in
any way soft on them we ought to tell them that no one here has any intention of doing
anything like that. What the hell have they got that anyone would want?‖175
Early in 1984, the widely-distributed news magazine Time reported an
announcement from the much more obscure Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that the
fabled ―doomsday clock‖ had been moved forward to three minutes before midnight, the
closest it had been since 1960.176 It was about this time that President Reagan seemed to
grasp what could have happened: ―I began to realize that many Soviet officials feared us
not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at
them in a first strike; because of this, and perhaps because of a sense of insecurity and
paranoia with roots reaching back to the invasions of Russia by Napoleon and Hitler, they
aimed a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons at us.‖177 Reagan‘s reaction to a revised CIA
assessment from early 1984 illustrated the flaw in the administration‘s reasoning.
Significantly influenced by Gordievsky‘s reports, this CIA assessment detailed the
intentions and efforts of the KGB to discover NATO‘s plans for the imminent nuclear
war. After reading the document, Reagan asked his National Security Advisor Robert
McFarlane for his opinion. McFarlane, for his part, ―did not think the highest Soviet
leaders could put credence in a completely nonexistent U.S. intention to attack.‖ Reagan
remained pensive, saying, ―I don‘t see how they could believe that – but it‘s something to
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think about.‖178 The Reagan Administration clearly did not understand that Soviet fears
of NATO aggression were no less dangerous because they were based on perception
instead of reality.
The threat of nuclear war hung so heavily on the American psyche that it became
the topic of several major films in 1983. The most noteworthy of which was The Day
After, a made-for-television movie produced by ABC Television that attracted an
audience estimated to be 100 million viewers.179 These movies not only reflected the
concerns of the populace, they also may have been influential in shaping President
Reagan‘s policy toward the Soviet Union.
On March 20, 1983, NBC viewers saw Special Bulletin, a television special that
brought the nuclear threat into the homes of the public as never before. According to the
numerous disclaimers, a ―realistic depiction of fictional events‖ played out before that
evening‘s viewers. Several techniques were used to enhance the realism and simulate
live, extemporaneous speech, such as showing actors struggle with lines and occasionally
talk over each other.180 The film made an obvious comment on the absurdity of the entire
concept of nuclear deterrence and ―mutual assured destruction‖ when the terrorists
threatened to detonate a nuclear bomb to save the world from nuclear bombs, and the
government responded with a general reluctance to accept the severity of the danger.
Although not specifically about nuclear war, Special Bulletin brought a realistic view of
the devastation caused by nuclear weapons into the homes of viewers at a critical time,
between Reagan‘s ―Evil Empire‖ and SDI speeches.

178

Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 67.
179
Hoffman, The Dead Hand, 96.
180
Special Bulletin, DVD, Directed by Edward Zwick, 1983 (Burbank, CA: Warner Home Video, 2010).

69

WarGames, the only nuclear war film of 1983 that was a major theatrical release,
opened in theaters on June 3 and featured several stars of the era, including Matthew
Broderick, Dabney Coleman, and Ally Sheedy. Regardless of the appeal of these
personalities, early reviews of the film described it as ―not really about people as much as
it's about fear and jeopardy. However, because it immediately connects with our
nightmares about thermonuclear war and a world ordered by unreliable computers, it
grabs us where we're most vulnerable.‖181 WarGames featured a prominent nonhuman
character: the computer known as the War Operation Plan Response, or WOPR. The
computer was installed as a result of a simulation in which some nuclear missile launch
control officers refused to fire their missiles, even under threat of their own lives.182
WarGames proved to be ahead of its time on several fronts. During development,
the question was raised as to whether or not it would even be possible for a simulation to
be mistaken for the real thing. Coincidentally, just such an event occurred.183 In fact,
there were three false alarms generated by computer malfunction prior to the release of
WarGames. During a system test on November 9, 1979, a simulation program
inexplicably appeared on the main screens and was transmitted to other strategic
installations. The false alarm was detected and cancelled only six minutes after it began,
but it proved it was possible. Two other false alarms, both in June 1983, were caused by
faulty components.184 Additionally, the process that led to the replacement of human
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operators by machines is remarkably similar to that of Stanislav Petrov, who defied all
procedures by refusing to launch his missiles.
Testament began as a short story, and its translation into film grew from an
American Playhouse production for public television to a Paramount Pictures-funded film
released to limited theaters on November 4, 1983. The storyline was based on a mother‘s
nightmare, as her family‘s regular routine was shattered by the unpredicted flash of a
nuclear explosion in nearby San Francisco. Testament focused on the tragedy and
sadness of nuclear war rather than the horror. Noticeably absent from the film were any
significant scenes of death or injury, although caskets and funerals were common sights.
There was a clear theme of loss, as beloved objects such as journals, teddy bears, friends
and family occasionally vanish.185 An interview with cast members for the twentieth
anniversary edition related a letter sent from Lukas Haas to President Reagan. Seven
years old at the time, Haas dictated his words while his mother typed. ―Just imagine how
you would feel if you were a kid and had to worry about nuclear war,‖ Haas wrote to his
president. ―Does your wife Nancy think the bombs are good too? Because I saw her on
the drugs program and she doesn‘t want kids to die from drugs so why should she want
them to die from bombs?‖ In a postscript, Haas added that he was in a movie in theaters
called Testament about a nuclear bomb.186
As with Testament, The Day After began with ordinary Midwestern families
carrying out their mundane routines in Lawrence, Kansas. In the background, news
reports suggested mounting tensions in Europe, but specific provocations were never
mentioned. Fears and frustrations mounted, while the population wondered, ―where does
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one go from Kansas City? To the Yukon? Tahiti?‖ Without warning, the missiles of
nearby Whiteman Air Force Base launched. Not all immediately realized the
implications, but some people did: enemy missiles were either already on the way or
would be soon as retaliation. The expected missiles arrived, and resulted in an
extraordinarily graphic depiction of nuclear holocaust. Interspersed throughout the
narrative were explanations of some of the technical jargon associated with nuclear war,
including ―extended deterrence,‖ ―launch on warning,‖ and ―electromagnetic pulse.‖ The
prognosis for the future was grim, with most of the population showing obvious physical
injuries and even more severe psychological wounds.
Even the development of the movie was significant due to the unique nature of its
subject matter. The director, Nicholas Meyer, started from the perspective that nuclear
war was ―such a terrible dilemma that none of us can really bear to think about it. So if
you make a movie about it, the audience will go anywhere their minds can rationalize to
avoid confronting the movie. They'd rather talk about the music or talk about how Jason
Robards was brilliant – anything, other than the subject. So as a director I found myself
engaged in a counterintuitive exercise of trying NOT to make a good movie.‖ Meyer did
all he could to avoid those pitfalls. ―I didn't want people talking about the music – which
is why after the opening credits there is no music.‖ Of more than eighty speaking parts,
only fifteen were Hollywood actors; the rest were locals, which reduced the distractions
caused by notable faces in the crowds.
What was intended to be a four-hour presentation over two nights was halved.
The director argued that the movie would be more powerful as a one-night event, and
eventually the executives agreed. Meyer recalled, "What they didn't tell me is that all the
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advertisers had fled. General Mills, General Motors, General Foods – all the Generals
had headed for the hills. So suddenly the advertising revenues that were anticipated
became completely moot. That's how it became a two-hour movie as it always should
have been." With a shortage of advertisements sold, the decision was made that the
movie would not be interrupted by commercials after the nuclear explosions. The result
intensified the experience for the audience. "The subject matter was so powerful at that
point that to cut to a commercial would have been ludicrous," Meyer indicated. "Even
they – the ubiquitous 'they' – were overwhelmed by the incongruity of going to ads for
oven cleaner after annihilation." By intent and by default, the broadcast grew in strength.
Eventually, the movie would be released theatrically in more than forty countries. 187
President Reagan was allowed the opportunity to screen The Day After at Camp
David on October 10, and recorded his reaction in his diary. ―It is powerfully done,‖ he
wrote, ―all $7 million worth. It‘s very effective and left me greatly depressed. So far
they haven‘t sold any of the twenty-five spot ads scheduled and I can see why. Whether
it will be of help to the ‗anti-nukes‘ or not, I can‘t say. My own reaction was one of
having to do all we can to have a deterrent and see there is never a nuclear war.‖188 The
Reagan Administration capitalized on the opportunity this movie made by having George
Shultz appear on ABC immediately following the broadcast to transition the dialogue
from anti-nuclear weapons propaganda to show ―why we must keep on doing what we‘re
doing.‖189 There may have been an unintended consequence, however; the Secretary of
State‘s appearance discussing nuclear war amplified the horror by bridging the gap
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between fiction and fact.190 Nikolai Ogarkov, chief of the Soviet General Staff and
highest-ranking military officer, also had an opportunity to view the film. During a fairly
ordinary press conference, a western reporter asked Marshal Ogarkov if he had seen The
Day After, to which Ogarkov replied, ''I have seen the film and I believe that the danger it
depicts is real.‖191 According to Nicholas Meyer, the Reagan administration confirmed
that The Day After had a long-term impact on the president: ―When he signed the
Intermediate Range Weapons Agreement at Reykjavik (in 1986) with Gorbachev, I got a
telegram from his administration that said, ‗Don‘t think your movie didn‘t have any part
of this, because it did.‘‖192
These movies resonated with American people by showing how suddenly their
ordinary lives could be irrevocably shattered, and how helpless they would be to protect
their families if anything happened. The anger and frustration of the general populace
was put into words in The Day After, when one survivor shouts, ―We knew the score, we
knew all about bombs and fallout, we knew this could happen for forty years and no one
was interested!‖193 None of these movies discussed the reasons behind the conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union, and none dealt with the specific issues
that escalated into nuclear exchange.
Three days after The Day After, the first Pershing II missiles arrived in West
Germany. The same day, November 23, Soviet representatives walked out of the
intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations. The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, or
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START, were the next to be abandoned on December 8, when the Soviets refused to set a
date to resume talks. On December 15, they also refused to set a date to resume talks on
reducing conventional arms.194 U.S.-Soviet relations were at their lowest ebb, without a
formal arms-control negotiation in progress for the first time in fourteen years.
On January 16, 1984, Reagan made his first overt gesture toward relieving tension
with the Soviet Union with his ―Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United
States-Soviet Relations.‖ Reagan‘s words were conciliatory for the first time, and
focused on the human beings who faced each other. ―Neither we nor the Soviet Union
can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies, but we
should always remember that we do have common interests and the foremost among
them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms.‖ Reagan went on to describe a
hypothetical, chance encounter between a Russian couple, Ivan and Anya, and an
American couple, Jim and Sally. In his overly simplistic metaphor, the two couples walk
away having learned that they had more commonalities than differences.195 While this
speech was a step in the right direction, it did little to thaw relations with the Soviets. In
his memoirs, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin wrote, ―At any other time, such a
speech by an American president would have been regarded as a tangible step toward
improving relations with the Soviet Union. But with all the other negative factors, to say
nothing of the imminent presidential election, it was hard to believe in Reagan‘s
sincerity.‖196
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Ambassador Dobrynin‘s logic was sound; President Reagan recognized the
problems U.S.-Soviet relations could cause in the elections. Former vice president
Walter Mondale, who was pursuing the Democratic nomination for the 1984 Presidential
election, introduced the tensions with the Soviet Union as a campaign issue. ―It‘s three
minutes to midnight, and we are scarcely talking to the Soviets at all,‖ Mondale alleged.
Mondale promised that his administration would have regular contact with Moscow, as
opposed to President Reagan, who ―may become the first president since Hoover never to
have met with his Soviet counterpart.‖197
In her memoir My Turn, Nancy Reagan indicated that her husband ―hadn‘t
intended to wait almost five years before he started meeting with his Soviet counterpart.‖
The reason Mrs. Reagan gave for the delay was the relatively rapid succession of Soviet
leaders; Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko were all in office
during President Reagan‘s first term. After the much-younger Mikhail Gorbachev
acceded to power, Nancy ―encouraged Ronnie to meet with Gorbachev as soon as
possible. … So yes, I did push Ronnie a little. But he would never have met Gorbachev
if he hadn‘t wanted to.‖198 Nancy suggested that it had always been Reagan‘s intention to
meet with the Soviets, but he had not considered the time to be right. By late 1983,
however, Reagan began to feel that he should wait no longer. In his diary, President
Reagan used the word ―sobering‖ twice over a three week span, regarding his November
18 briefing with Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General John Vessey on the complete nuclear war contingency plan and
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his December 9 briefing on Soviet offensive power and nuclear war plans.199 The time
was approaching for the negotiations President Reagan had been wanting but unable to
pursue.
George Shultz‘s memory of President Reagan‘s attitude toward negations with
the Soviet Union was quite similar to the one recorded by Nancy Reagan. Shultz related
a story of events that occurred on February 12, 1983, while he was Secretary of State:
[President Reagan] recognized how difficult it was for him to move
forward in dealing with [the Soviet Union and China]. He realized, I
thought, that he was in a sense blocked by his own White House staff, by
the Defense Department, by Bill Casey in the CIA, and by his own past
rhetoric. Now that we were talking in this family setting, I could see that
Ronald Reagan was much more willing to move forward in relations with
these two Communist nations—even travel to them—than I had earlier
believed.200
Shultz promoted negotiations with the Soviets, and produced a detailed memorandum for
the president in March 1983 titled, ―U.S.-Soviet Relations: Where Do We Want to Be
and How Do we Get There?‖ that asserted that there was ―a chance to … make some
progress toward a more stable and constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship over the next two
years or so.‖ Shultz also counseled restraint, fearing that ―if we warmed up the U.S.Soviet relationship, our European allies might jump out in front of us and try to move
much faster than would be warranted or wise. We would have to move together so that
the Soviets would not get an opportunity to split our alliance.‖201 Shultz arrived in
Sweden on the same day as Reagan‘s conciliatory speech, and found himself working to
restrain the enthusiasm. ―Such talk,‖ Shultz wrote, ―raised expectations that would lead
to disappointment if nothing happened.‖ Shultz described the U.S. strategy as ―easy to
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state but difficult to implement,‖ and explained that ―we needed to maintain the strength
of our position and the cohesiveness of our alliance, and we also needed to show that we
were ready for any reasonable dialogue with the Soviets.‖202
The day after President Reagan‘s first conciliatory speech, he seized another
opportunity to explore increased relations with the Soviet Union. Robert McFarlane
arranged for Suzanne Massie, author and amateur Sovietologist, to initiate unofficial
contact between the United States and the Soviet Union. To add credibility to her
mission, she asked to meet President Reagan before her flight to Moscow. Reagan was
immediately intrigued by this woman‘s commonplace approach to international relations
and emphasis on the Russian people.203 Massie was described by historian James Mann
as ―Reagan‘s window on the Soviet Union,‖ and provided the personal experiences
Reagan needed to guide him as he tried to reduce tensions with Moscow.204 The actual
impact of Massie‘s unofficial diplomacy is unclear – the National Security Council‘s
leading Soviet specialist, Jack Matlock, considered Massie a marginal figure – but she
continued to serve as an intermediary for the two superpowers throughout the Reagan
Administration.205
While the Soviet political system predicted the need to launch a preemptive
nuclear first strike, it also undercut the ability to do so. General Secretary Andropov had
been in a precarious state of health since experiencing kidney failure in February 1983,
and was described by a West German photographer in July as ―a man with the mark of
death on his face.‖ By the time U.S. forces had liberated Grenada in October, Andropov
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was a permanent resident of a VIP suite in a Moscow hospital. Andropov clung to
power, issuing directives by telephone, memoranda, and through his inner-circle of
associates. Former KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky characterized Andropov at this point
as a ―morbidly suspicious invalid brooding over the possible approach of a nuclear
Armageddon.‖ Andropov knew he was dying, and was in a position to contemplate
nuclear war without concern for his own personal survival.206
In all likelihood, the political turmoil surrounding Andropov‘s deterioration and
eventual death on February 9, 1984, was the single most influential factor that reduced
the nuclear war fears that peaked in 1983. Four days after Andropov‘s death, seventytwo year old Konstantin Chernenko, described as a ―walking mummy,‖ was elected to
replace him as General Secretary.207 Chernenko held the post until his death, only
thirteen months later. Chernenko was the last General Secretary who had lived through
the Bolshevik Revolution, and he was replaced by the much younger Mikhail Gorbachev,
fifty-four years old at the time.208 During this period of uncertainty, Kremlin leaders
were concerned with things other than international affairs: ―Most of them, because of
their old age, began to think more about their health, reduction of their workload, and
retirement perks than about the preservation of Soviet power.‖209 Reagan was now facing
his fourth General Secretary of the Communist Party, a position that prompted him to
remark, ―How am I supposed to get anyplace with the Russians, if they keep dying on
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me?‖210 Despite Reagan‘s implied desire for stability in the Soviet Union, it was likely
just this instability that contributed to the prevention of nuclear war.
During the critical period of late 1983, the Soviet Union was a ship without a
captain. The appointed leaders were not competent or trusted to make critical decisions,
and their associates were not willing or able to seize the initiative. The first field
exercises involving ground-launched cruise missiles – long an Operation RYAN indicator
– were conducted on March 9, 1984, at RAF Greenham Common in the United Kingdom.
The KGB‘s London field office failed to forecast the exercise, resulting in station chief
Arkadi Guk‘s panicked exclamation, ―What‘s going on? The enemy are preparing for
atomic war and we have no one in the residency!‖ Despite Guk‘s alarmist interpretation
and one of the first substantial results of Operation RYAN, there was virtually no
response from the post-Andropov Kremlin.211 As the threat of nuclear war diminished
throughout the remainder of the Cold War, it is quite possible that Soviet bureaucratic
inertia had saved the world.
During the year 1983 the United States and Soviet Union came closer to a nuclear
war than even during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Given the new technologies and hardline positions of those involved, a war in 1983 would likely have been even more
dangerous. The Soviet Union was headed by the man who initiated a paranoid
impossible mission to discover nonexistent war plans; the United States was led by a
lifelong anticommunist who believed ―containment‖ and ―détente‖ were too soft. The
United States was surging ahead technologically with the deadly and precise Pershing II
missile, the mysteriously capable space shuttle program, and a lofty plan for a missile-
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defense system. The U.S. military regained its footing with elaborate operations like
FleetEx 83-1, Urgent Fury, and Able Archer ‘83. All this occurred while launching a
rhetorical offensive against the so-called ―evil empire.‖ The Soviet Union‘s insecurity
manifested as violence, with an attack on a Korean Airlines jet that resulted in the deaths
of 269 civilians, and heightened alert levels among their nuclear forces. The Soviet
Union felt cornered by the events of 1983, with no apparent recourse except to initiate a
preemptive nuclear war. Only President Reagan‘s relaxation of the rhetorical pressure
and General Secretary Andropov‘s eventual demise due to kidney failure forestalled that
outcome. Throughout 1984 and until the end of the Cold War, U.S.-Soviet relations
improved dramatically from those of 1983, the most dangerous year.
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APPENDIX
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

May 1972 -

ABM and SALT I treaties exemplify era of détente

March 11, 1976 -

SS-20 mobile intermediate range missiles deployed to Eastern Europe

March 13, 1979 -

Maurice Bishop‘s New Jewel Movement takes power in Grenada

December 12, 1979 -

NATO announces plan to deploy Pershing II intermediate range missiles

December 21, 1979 -

Soviet Union begins armed intervention in Afghanistan

January 20, 1981 -

Ronald Reagan inaugurated as 40th President of the United States

April 12, 1981 -

Space Shuttle Columbia launched

May 1981 -

KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov announces Operation RYAN

November 12, 1982 -

Yuri Andropov becomes General Secretary of the Communist Party

January 17, 1983 -

President Reagan signs National Security Decision Directive 75

March 8, 1983 -

Reagan speaks to Nat‘l Association of Evangelicals (Evil Empire speech)

March 20, 1983 -

Special Bulletin airs on NBC

March 23, 1983 -

Reagan speaks on defense and national security (SDI speech)

March 25 - April 7 -

United States Navy conducts FleetEx-83-1 in North Pacific

April 4, 1983 -

Space Shuttle Challenger launched

June 3, 1983 -

WarGames theatrical release

August 12, 1983 -

Supplemental Operation RYAN instructions issued

September 1, 1983 -

Korean Airlines Flight 007 shot down

September 26, 1983 -

Soviet early-warning system ―Oko‖ failure

October 10, 1983 -

Reagan previews The Day After

October 25, 1983 -

Operation Urgent Fury initiated

November 2 - 11 -

NATO conducts Able Archer ‘83 exercises in Europe

November 4, 1983 -

Soviet submarine Victor III failure; Testament limited theatrical release

November 20, 1983 -

The Day After airs on ABC to a record audience

November 23, 1983 -

Pershing II mobile intermediate range missiles arrive in Europe

December 8, 1983 -

Soviets suspend arms reduction talks

January 16, 1984 -

Reagan speaks on U.S.-Soviet relations (conciliatory speech)

January 17, 1984 -

Reagan meets author and amateur Sovietologist Suzanne Massie

February 9, 1984 -

Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov dies

March 9, 1984 -

United States Air Force tests cruise missiles at Greenham Common
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